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#### The affirmative’s attempt to proliferate black knowledge production will be incorporated into the system and sold as a new market for capital’s infiltration. Their framing certainly does not resist capitalism commodification. Despite the best intentions, Difference and identity can and must only be understood from a class-based perspective. This is key to creating a successful movement capable of catalyzing ethical demands at the global level

D’Annibale and McLaren 2004(Valerie Catamburio, PhD, chairs the Graduate Program in Communication and Social Justice at the University of Windsor, and Peter, professor in the Division of Urban Schooling, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, UCLA, “The Strategic Centrality of Class in the Politics of "Race" and "Difference”,” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies, Vol. 3, No. 2, 148-175 (2003))

Because post-al theories of difference often circumvent the material dimensions of difference and tend to segregate questions of difference from analyses¶ of class formation and capitalist social relations, we contend that it is necessary¶ to (re)conceptualize difference by drawing on Marx’s materialist and historical¶ formulations. Difference needs to be understood as the product of social contradictions and in relation to political and economic organization. Because systems of difference almost always involve relations of domination and oppression, we must concern ourselves with the economies of relations of difference¶ that exist in specific contexts. Drawing on the Marxist concept of mediation¶ enables us to unsettle the categorical (and sometimes overly rigid) approaches¶ to both class and difference for it was Marx himself who warned against creating false dichotomies at the heart of our politics—that it was absurd to choose¶ between consciousness and the world, subjectivity and social organization,¶personal or collective will, and historical or structural determination. In a similar vein, it is equally absurd to see “difference as a historical form of consciousness unconnected to class formation, development of capital and class politics”¶ (Bannerji, 1995, p. 30). Bannerji has pointed to the need to historicize difference in relation to the history and social organization of capital and class¶ (inclusive of imperialist and colonialist legacies) and to acknowledge the¶ changing configurations of difference and “otherness.” Apprehending the¶ meaning and function of difference in this manner necessarily highlights the¶ importance of exploring (a) the institutional and structural aspects of difference; (b) the meanings and connotations that are attached to categories of difference; (c) how differences are produced out of, and lived within, specific his torical, social, and political formations; and (d) the production of difference in¶ relation to the complexities, contradictions, and exploitative relations of¶ capitalism.¶ Moreover, it presents a challenge to “identitarian” understandings of difference based almost exclusively on questions of cultural and/or racial hegemony.¶In such approaches, the answer to oppression often amounts to creating greater¶ cultural space for the formerly excluded to have their voices heard (represented). Much of what is called the “politics of difference” is little more than a¶ demand for an end to monocultural quarantine and for inclusion into the metropolitan salons of bourgeois representation—a posture that reinscribes a¶ neoliberal pluralist stance rooted in the ideology of free market capitalism. In¶ short, the political sphere is modeled on the marketplace, and freedom¶ amounts to the liberty of all vendors to display their different “cultural” goods.¶A paradigmatic expression of this position is encapsulated in the following passage that champions a form of difference politics whose presumed aim¶ is to make social groups appear. Minority and immigrant ethnic groups have laid¶ claim to the street as a legitimate forum for the promotion and exhibition of traditional dress, food, and culture....[This] is a politics of visibility and invisibility. Because it must deal with a tradition of representation that insists on subsuming varied social practices to a standard norm, its struggle is as much on the¶ page, screen . . . as it is at the barricade and in the parliament, traditional¶ forums of political intervention before the postmodern. (Fuery& Mansfield,¶2000, p. 150)¶ This position fosters a “fetishized” understanding of difference in terms of primordial and seemingly autonomous cultural identities and treats such “differences” as inherent, as ontologically secure cultural traits of the individuals of¶ particular cultural communities. Rather than exploring the construction of¶ difference within specific contexts mediated by the conjunctural¶ embeddedness of power differentials, we are instead presented with an overflowing cornucopia of cultural particularities that serve as markers of ethnicity,¶ race, group boundaries, and so forth. In this instance, the discourse of difference operates ideologically—cultural recognition derived from the rhetoric of¶ tolerance averts our gaze from relations of production and presents a strategy¶ for attending to difference as solely an ethnic, racial, or cultural issue.¶What advocates of such an approach fail to acknowledge is that the forces of¶ diversity and difference are allowed to flourish provided that they remain¶ within the prevailing forms of capitalist social arrangements. The neopluralism¶ of difference politics cannot adequately pose a substantive challenge to the productive system of capitalism that is able to accommodate a vast pluralism of¶ ideas and cultural practices. In fact, the post-al themes of identity, difference,¶ diversity, and the like mesh quite nicely with contemporary corporate interests¶ precisely because they revere lifestyle—the quest for, and the cultivation of, the¶ self—and often encourage the fetishization of identities in the marketplace as they compete for “visibility” (Boggs, 2000; Field, 1997). Moreover, the¶ uncritical, celebratory tone of various forms of difference politics can also¶ lead to some disturbing conclusions. For example, if we take to their logical¶ conclusion the statements that “postmodern political activism fiercely contests¶ the reduction of the other to the same,” that post-al narratives believe that “difference needs to be recognized and respected at all levels” (Fuery& Mansfield,¶2000, p. 148), and that the recognition of different subject positions is paramount (Mouffe, 1988, pp. 35-36), their political folly becomes clear. Eagleton¶ (1996) sardonically commented on the implications:¶Almost all postmodern theorists would seem to imagine that difference, variability and heterogeneity are “absolute” goods, and it is a position I have long held¶ myself. It has always struck me as unduly impoverishing of British social life that¶ we can muster a mere two or three fascist parties. . . . The opinion that plurality is¶ a good in itself is emptily formalistic and alarmingly unhistorical. (pp. 126-127)¶ The liberal pluralism manifest in discourses of difference politics often means a¶ plurality without conflict, contestation, or contradiction. The inherent limitations of this position are also evident if we turn our attention to issues of class.¶Expanding on Eagleton’s observations and adopting the logic that seems to¶ inform the unqualified celebration of difference, one would be compelled to¶ champion class differences as well. Presumably, the differences between the¶ 475 billionaires whose combined wealth now equals the combined yearly¶ incomes of more than 50% of the world’s population are to be celebrated—a¶ posturing that would undoubtedly lend itself to a triumphant endorsement of¶ capitalism and inequitable and exploitative conditions. San Juan (1995) noted¶ that the cardinal flaw in current instantiations of culturalism lies in its decapitation of discourses of intelligibility from the politics of antagonistic relations.¶He framed the question quite pointedly: “In a society stratified by uneven¶ property relations, by asymmetrical allocation of resources and of power, can¶ there be equality of cultures and genuine toleration of differences?” (pp. 232-¶ 233).

#### Modern capitalism ensures that Differentiations exist between the ontological *worlds* of identity politics. These differentiations are central to violence and extermination and necessitate unending war. The alternatives presupposition of ethical equality is a prerequisite to dealing with zones of sacrifice like debate

Balibar, 2001 (Etienne, Emeritus Prof. of Philosophy @ U. of Paris X Nanterre and U. of Cal., Irvine, “Outlines of a Topography of Cruelty: Citizenship and Civility in the Era of Global Violence,” Constellations, Vol. 8.1)

this paper is based on a talk which I was asked to deliver in November 1999 for the opening of the Graduate Course in Humanitarian Action at the University of Geneva.2 This will explain why the issues of citizenship and segregation, asylum and migration, mass poverty and genocides in the globalized world order will play a central role in this discussion. These are to me the crucial “cosmopo- litical” issues which we should try to locate and connect if we want to understand how and why democratic citizenship in today’s world cannot be separated from an invention of concrete forms and strategies of civility.¶I shall focus on two sets of problems. The first is typically European. I am thinking of the negative counterpart of the post-national integration and introduc- tion of “European Citizenship,” which is not only a revival of so-called “commu- nitarian” demands and “identity politics,” but above all a development of quasi-Apartheid social structures and institutions. This forms a contradictory pattern, which in many respects is now becoming highly unstable. The second set of problems is global: it appears as a systematic use of various forms of extreme violence and mass insecurity to prevent collective movements of emancipation that aim at transforming the structures of domination. For this reason – and also with the pattern of state-construction that Thomas Hobbes once described in the Leviathan as preventive counter-violence in mind – I shall not hesitate to speak of a politics of global preventive counter-revolution or counter-insurrection. But from another angle this “politics” is really anti-political, since in a nihilistic way it leads to suppressing the very conditions of building a polity. Instead, we witness the joint development of various sorts of wars and a kind of “humanitarian” action or intervention, which in many cases becomes an instrument in the service of precisely those powers who created the distress. Not by chance, in these two sets of problems the traditional institution of borders, which I think can be defined in the modern era as a “sovereign” or non-democratic condition of democracy itself, mainly works as an instrument of security controls, social segregation, and unequal access to the means of existence, and sometimes as an institutional distri- bution of survival and death: it becomes a cornerstone of institutional violence. This explains in advance why I shall insist on the democratization of borders, not only as their opening (and perhaps least of all as their generalized abolition, which in many cases would simply lead to a renewed war of all against all in the form of wild competition among economic forces), but above all as a multilateral, negotiated control of their working by the populations themselves (including, of course, migrant populations). Perhaps new representative institutions should be set up in this regard which are not merely “territorial” and certainly not purely national. This is part of what I would call a “cosmopolitics of human rights,” where citizenship and civility are closely associated.¶Before giving more detail about the two sets of concrete problems I want to deal with here, I think that we need some philosophical instruments to place them in the broader perspective of a reflection on the relationship between human rights and politics. It is widely accepted – and I share this view to a large extent – that here Hannah Arendt’s work provides a necessary starting point. Allow me a few considerations on what we can draw from her. In her discussion of imperialism in The Origins of Totalitarianism she addresses the question of “stateless” popula- tions, deprived of any civil and civic rights, which had been immensely increased in Europe (and elsewhere) after the two world wars.3 In so doing, she inverts the perspective of political philosophy in a double manner.¶First, she reinstalls – right in the middle of debates about citizenship and polit- ical regimes – forms of exclusion and situations of extreme violence where the survival of humans, as mere representatives of the species, is threatened. She did not want only to assert a humanistic criterion with a view to doing justice, but to show that it is only through the discovery of a solution for such situations that we can find a new foundation for the public sphere, where collective political action (or praxis) takes place, and not only the management of population movements and policing of social conflicts. In a very similar way, the French philosopher Jacques Rancière more recently argued that, since the very origins of democracy, the measure of equal liberty for all in the political realm was based on “la part des sans part,” i.e., giving a fair share to those who hold no share in the common- wealth, or the political recognition of the have-nots. In other words, this would mean an active transformation of exclusion processes into processes of inclusion of the discriminated categories into the “city” or the “polity.”4 This is exactly what isonomia in Greek cities was about. In this respect, “politics” in the strong sense becomes inseparable from “permanent revolution,” a notion that Hannah Arendt might have inherited from Rosa Luxemburg.¶From this perspective, the juridical form of equal liberty is clearly not elimi- nated. But it has to be reworked completely. With respect to the principles of modern humanism-universalism, a notion of “persons without rights” is a contra- diction in terms, since de jure nobody is without rights, not even children or the handicapped. But if we view positively, for instance, such claims as those of prop- ertyless peasants in Brazil, whose motto is “justice for the rightless” when they demand that paramilitary forces who kill and terrorize the poor be tried and condemned, or those of migrant workers in France who protest against their being denied official documents by asking for a “droit de cité pour les sans papiers” (legal residence for the undocumented), we can view these demands based on resistance and the refusal of violence as partial but direct expressions of the process of the creation of rights, a dynamic which allows the political constitution to become recognized as “popular sovereignty” or democracy.¶ This is one aspect of the lessons we can draw from Arendt’s reflections on citi- zenship, but there is another which in a sense is even more relevant today. I am thinking of the famous argument showing that the history of nation-states has produced a reversal of the traditional relationship between “human rights” and “political rights” (or droits de l’homme and droits du citoyen) since they evolved from the originary democratic national revolutions to the generalization of inter- national conflicts and the development of imperialism. Human rights in general can no longer be considered a mere prerequisite and an abstract foundation for political rights that are set up and preserved within the limits of a given national and sovereign state, but neither can they be considered to set a limit to the domi- nation of the political over the juridical; it has become the opposite, as the tragic experiences of imperialism and totalitarianism in the twentieth century made manifest. We discovered that political rights, the actual granting and conditions of equal citizenship, were the true basis for a recognition and definition of “human rights” – to begin with, the most elementary ones concerning survival, naked life. Giving a new, “unpolitical” meaning to the zôonpolitikon itself, those who were not citizens of some state, who were “citizens of nowhere in the world,” were no longer practically recognized and treated as humans. When the positive institu- tional rights of the citizen are destroyed – e.g., when, in a given historical context where citizenship and nationhood are closely associated, individuals and groups are chased out of their national belonging or simply put in the situation of an oppressed national “minority” – the basic rights which are supposed to be “natural” or “universally human” are threatened and destroyed: we witness forms of extreme violence, creating a distinction between so-called Untermenschen (subhumans) and “humans” believed to be supermen, Übermenschen. This is by no means a contingent phenomenon; it results from an irreversible process that has become common in contemporary politics. It imposes upon democracy the immediate task of a renewed foundation. The very essence of politics is at stake, since politics is not a mere “superstructure” above the social and natural condi- tions of life, communication, and culture. The true concept of politics already concerns the very possibility of a community among humans, establishing a space for encounter, for the expression and dialectical resolution of antagonisms among its various constitutive parts and groups.¶Seen from this angle, the crucial notion suggested by Arendt, that of a “right to have rights,” does not feature a minimal remainder of the political, made of juridi- cal and moral claims to be protected by a constitution; it is much more the idea of a maximum. Or, better said, it refers to the continuous process in which a minimal recognition of the belonging of human beings to the “common” sphere of exis- tence (and therefore also of work, culture, public and private speech, etc.) already involves a totality of rights, and makes it possible. I call this the “insurrectional” element of democracy, which predetermines every constitution of a democratic or republican state. Such a state, by definition, cannot consist (or cannot only consist) of statuses and rights ascribed from above; it requires the direct partici- pation of the demos. I should say that Arendt’s argument clearly recognizes the importance of the egalitarian or insurrectional element constitutive of democratic citizenship, but there is more: what she displays is the dialectical relationship of this element and the politics of civility. This comes from the fact that the radically excluded, those who, being denied citizenship, are also automatically denied the material conditions of life and the recognition of their human dignity, do not provide only a theoretical criterion to evaluate historical institutions against the model of the ideal constitution. They also force us to address the reality of extreme violence in contemporary political societies – nay, in the very heart of their everyday life. This is only a seeming paradox: the limit or the “state of exception” (Schmitt) is noth- ing exceptional. On the contrary, it is “banal”; it permeates the functioning of social and political systems which claim or believe themselves to be “democra- tic.” It is both an instrument for the continuity of their vested interests in power, and a permanent threat to their vitality. This is why we should not consider the choice between access to and denial of the rights of citizenship – more generally, the possibility and impossibility of an inclusive political order – as a speculative issue. It is a concrete challenge. The (democratic) political order is intrinsically fragile or precarious; if not continuously recreated in a politics of civility, it becomes again a “state of war,” within or across borders.¶We know that Arendt’s argument was based on the experience of a “catastrophe” in European history: Nazism, World War Two, and the racist extermination of European Jews, Gypsies, and other groups. She tried to trace back its “origins” in the evolution of the nation-form towards imperialism, while at the same time carefully remaining aware of its uniqueness. We might summarize her idea by speaking of a deadly circle in which the national constitution of the state had trapped us. The nation-state was at the same time the sole positive or institutional horizon for the recognition of human rights and an “impossible” one, producing the destruction of the universal values it had supported. Now we must ask ourselves whether we are still living and acting in the same conditions. If not, we should ask what the claim of “a right to have rights” could become in today’s politics. This question becomes a burning one when we observe that, although the nation-form has not simply been withering away, the conditions of politics, the economy, and culture, the material distribution of power and the possibilities of controlling it, have become increasingly transnational. “Post- national” state or quasi-state institutions have emerged in the general framework of globalization. The “European Community” is a privileged case of these develop- ments. Let us first reflect on some of the contradictory and worrying aspects of this process, which, seen from another side, holds much promise.¶I take it to be a crucial issue to acknowledge that, along with the development of a formal “European citizenship,” a real “European Apartheid” has emerged. In the long or even the short run, it could obstruct or block the construction of a democra- tic European community. It could therefore block European construction altogether, since there is no real possibility of the supranational community being achieved in an authoritarian way, à la Bismarck, even for the sake of accumulating power or creating a regional power which would be able to match the world’s economic, political, and military superpower. A supranational European community will exist only if, compared with existing national constitutions, it means a democratic surplus for the majority. Let me clarify the issue by asking two symmetrical ques- tions: Why speak of a European Apartheid? Why speak of Apartheid in Europe?¶Why speak of a European “Apartheid”? This cannot be simply the case because foreigners are granted lesser rights (more precisely: some categories of foreigners, mainly immigrant workers and asylum seekers from the East and the South who legally or illegally crossed the frontiers protecting the wealthy “civilization” of Europe, the Balkan region featuring in this respect a kind of combination of both extraneities). There must be something qualitatively new. This is indeed the case with the new developments of the construction of Europe since the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht. In each and every one of the European nation-states, there exist structures of discrimination which command uneven access to citizenship or nationality, particularly those inherited from the colonial past. But the additional fact with the birth of the European Union (coming after a mere European Economic Community) is that a concept of CivisEuropeanus progressively acquires a specific content: new individual and collective rights, which progres- sively become effective (e.g., possibilities to appeal to European Courts against one’s own national administration and system of justice).¶Now the crucial question becomes: new rights for whom? It could be, abstractly speaking, either for the whole population of Europe, or simply for a more limited European people (I am expanding here the dilemma which is now taking place in Germany about the distinction between Volk and Bevölkerung, since this dilemma actually concerns all of Europe and the German controversy is paradigmatic). It proves very difficult and embarrassing to “define” the Euro- pean people as the symbolic, legal, and material basis for the European constituency. Maastricht solved the problem by simply stating that those and only those who already possess citizenship (i.e., are nationals) in one of the constituent national states will automatically be granted European citizenship. But this – which may remind us of debates among the Founding Fathers of the US Consti- tution – already determines an orientation. Given the quantitative and qualitative importance of the immigrant population permanently residing in Europe (what French political scientist Catherine de Wenden has called “the sixteenth member- state”5), it immediately transforms a project of inclusion into a program of exclu- sion which could be summarized by three metamorphoses:¶• from foreigners to aliens (meaning second-class residents who are deemed to be of a different kind);¶ • from protection to discrimination (this is a very sensitive issue, as shown by the Austrian case, but again, with some differences in degree and language, it is a general European problem: since some of the immigrant workers who are deprived of political citizenship enjoy some social rights, i.e., are included in “social citizenship,” it becomes a crucial political issue and an obsession for conservative forces to have them expelled from welfare, social protection, etc. – what the French National Front has called préférencenationale, but precisely because a degree of préférence already exists in the national institutions, it is likely to become a préférenceeuropéenne); and finally,¶ • from cultural difference to racial stigmatization, which is the heart of the creation of the “new racism,” postcolonial and post-national. Why suggest a parallel with South African “Apartheid”? This could only be a useless provocation. . . Should we really suggest that, while Apartheid has offi- cially disappeared in Africa, it is now reappearing in Europe (and perhaps also elsewhere) – a further development in the process of “the Empire striking back” (Paul Gilroy)? We could think of comparisons with other historical cases of insti- tutional racism, for example the US, which we know has never completely forgot- ten the Jim Crow system, and periodically seems to be on the way to recreating it when conservative policy is on the agenda. . . For his part, my German colleague Helmut Dietrich, who has long worked on refugees and migrants on the “Eastern Border” of Europe, particularly the Balkans, spoke of the Hinterland of the new European Reich, etc.¶ Leaving aside the question of how to measure the amount of suffering created by one or another system and focusing instead on the structures, I suggest two complementary reasons at least to borrow lessons from the historical example of Apartheid, i.e., to compare the situation of the regions whence most of the migrants come, in Africa, Asia, or other parts of Europe, with homelands in the South African sense. One is that the position of the important group of workers who “reproduce” their lives on one side of the border and “produce” on the other side, and thus more precisely are neither insiders nor outsiders, or (for many of us) are insiders officially considered outsiders, produces a steady increase in the amount and the violence of “security” controls, which spread everywhere in the society and ramify the borderline throughout the “European” territory, combining modern techniques of identification and recording with good old “racial profil- ing” (contrôle au faciès). This in particular is what the Schengen agreement was about. The second complementary reason is that the existence of migrant families (and their composition, their way of life) has become a true obsession for migra- tion policies and public opinion. Should the alien families be separated or united (that is, reunited)? If so, on which side of the border, which kind of families (traditional, modern), which kind of relatives (parents, children), with what kind of rights, etc.? As I have argued elsewhere, the interference of family politics, more generally a politics of genealogy, with the definition of the national “community” is a crucial structural mode of production of historical racism.6 Of course, this is also true when the national becomes multinational community.¶From all this we might draw the conclusion that a de-segregated Europe, i.e., a democratic Europe, is far from the agenda. Indeed, the situation is much more contradictory, since tendencies point in both directions; we are in the middle of a historical crossroad that is, only partially and reluctantly acknowledged. But I prefer to insist on another idea, which provides me with the necessary transition to the next point, namely the fact that these issues typically illustrate a global-local (“glocal”) problem. The contradictory and evolutionary pattern of “European citi- zenship-cum-Apartheid” (or statutory, ascriptive citizenship) (Rogers Smith) in a sense is a reaction to real and imaginary effects of globalization. In another sense it is a mere projection, albeit with historical specificities, of such effects. I shall now directly address the main issue that I announced, that of the “global counter-insurrection”: not the violence of the border, but the violence without borders or beyond borders.¶Allow me to quote from a recent study of humanitarian action, published by a Swiss expert, Pierre de Senarclens of the University of Lausanne, who rightly insists on the importance of official definitions of contemporary violence and also on the problematic aspects of the justifications they provide for an extension of the scope and meaning of “humanitarian interventions”:¶ In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution dedicated to a New International Humanitarian Order. . . . Shortly thereafter, the Assembly gave its support to the creation of an independent commission on international humani- tarian questions, which brought together eminent people. . . . The Commission’s 1986 report placed within the humanitarian project the principal political and social challenges of the age, such as environmental degradation, demographic transition, population movements, human rights violations, weapons of mass destruction, North-South polarization, terrorism, and drugs.7¶ He concludes: “We consider humanitarianism as a frame of reference for the iden- tification of important contemporary problems and a formula for their solution.” Later the author shows how, after 1989, the collapse of the Cold War system of “two camps” suppressed the limits which the confrontation between the super- powers had set to political violence, and blurred the borderlines between “war” and “peace”:¶No one foresaw the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the prelude to the swift end of the Cold War. Nor did anyone anticipate the transformations in international struc- tures and the violence that followed. Toward the mid-1990s, we count more than fifty new armed conflicts, essentially civil wars. Certain of these conflicts – in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Chechnia, or Algeria – astonish by their violence and cruelty, by the extent of the destruction and the population movements they provoke. Inter- national society has never been confronted with so many wars making so many victims in such a short time.8¶ In such conditions, we can incline towards diverging conclusions. Either we think that the multifaceted phenomenon of mass violence and extreme violence has generally replaced politics, including internal and external relationships of forces among states, or we fully take into account the fact that the fields of poli- tics and violence – a violence that seems to lack rational organization, not except- ing self-destruction – are no longer separated; they have progressively permeated one another. It is precisely in such conditions that something called “humanitar- ian action” or “intervention,” both “private” and “public,” has become the neces- sary supplement of politics. I cannot discuss all the aspects of this mutation, but I would like briefly to address three questions which seem to me to have an importance for the concept of politics itself. 1. Are we facing an “unprecedented” spread of extreme violence (or violence of the extremes)?¶I should like to be very careful on this point, which raises a number of discussions ranging from the issue of “old and new wars”9 to the highly sensitive moral ques- tions of why and how to “compare genocides” in history. Perhaps what is unprecedented is basically the new visibility of extreme violence, particularly in the sense that modern techniques of media coverage and broadcasting and the transformation of images – in the end, as we could see for the first time on a grand scale during the Gulf War, of the production of “virtual reality” – transform extreme violence into a show, and display this show simultaneously before a world audience. We also know that the effect of such techniques is, at the same time, to uncover some violent processes, or scenes of horror (truly horrifying, such as hundreds of mutilated children in Angola or Sierra Leone), and to cover up others (equally horrifying, such as babies starving in Baghdad). We suspect that powerful ideological biases are at work when the coverage of extreme violence gives credit to such simple ideas as the political transition from the “equilibrium of terror” during the Cold War to the “competition among victims” through the undifferentiated uses of the legal and moral but hardly political notion of “crimes against humanity.” In the end, we become aware of the fact that talk- ing about and showing the images of everyday horror produces, particularly in the relatively wealthy and protected regions of humanity, a very ambivalent effect: raising compassion but also disgust, reinforcing the idea that humankind as such is really divided into qualitatively different cultures or civilizations, which, according to one political scientist, can only lead to a “clash” among them.¶I am aware of all these difficulties, but I would maintain that a reality lies behind the notion of something “unprecedented.” Perhaps it is simply the fact that a number of heterogeneous methods or processes of extermination (by which I mean eliminating masses of individuals inasmuch as they belong to objective or subjective groups) have themselves become “globalized,” i.e., operate in a simi- lar manner everywhere in the world at the same time, and so progressively form a “chain,” giving full reality to what E.P. Thompson anticipated 20 years ago with the name “exterminism.”10 In this series of connected processes, we must include, precisely because they are heterogeneous – they do not have one and the same “cause,” but they produce cumulative effects:¶• wars (both “civil” and “foreign,” a distinction which is not easy to draw in many cases – think of Yugoslavia or Chechnya);¶ • communal rioting, with ethnic and/or religious ideologies of “cleansing”;¶ • famines and other kinds of “absolute” poverty produced by the ruin of tradi-¶ tional or non-traditional economies;¶ • seemingly “natural” catastrophes which in fact are killing on a mass scale¶ because they are overdetermined by social, economic, and political structures, such as pandemics (think of the difference in the distribution of AIDS and the possibilities of treatment between Europe and Northern America on one side, and Africa and some parts of Asia on the other), draught, floods, or earthquakes in the absence of developed civil protection. . .¶ In the end it would be my suggestion that the “gobalization” of various kinds of extreme violence has produced a tendential division of the “globalized” world into life-zones and death-zones. Between these zones (which indeed are intricate, frequently reproduced within the boundaries of a single country or city) there exists a decisive and fragile superborder, which raises fears and concerns about the unity and division of mankind – something like a global and local “enmity line,” like the “amity line” which existed in the beginning of the modern Euro- pean seizure of the world.11 It is this superborder, this enmity line, that becomes at the same time an object of permanent show and a hot place for intervention. But also for nonintervention. We might consider whether the most worrying aspect of present international politics is “humanitarian intervention” or “gener- alized non-intervention,” or one coming after the other. . .¶ 2. Should we consider that extreme violence is “rational” or “functional” from the point of view of market capitalism (“liberal economics”)?¶This is a very difficult question – in fact, I think it is the most difficult question – but it cannot be avoided. Again, we should warn against a paralogism that is only too obvious but nonetheless frequent: that of mistaking consequences for goals or purposes. (But is it really possible to discuss social systems in terms of purposes? On the other hand, can we avoid reflecting on the immanent ends of a given structure, such as capitalism, or its “logic”?) It seems to me, very schematically, that the difficulty arises from the two opposite “global effects” which derive from the emergence of a chain of mass violence – as compared, for example, with what Marx called primitive accumulation when he described the creation of the preconditions for capitalist accumulation in terms of violent suppression of the poor.¶One kind of effect is simply to generalize material and moral insecurity for millions of potential workers, i.e., to induce a massive proletarianization or repro- letarianization (a new phase of proletarianization which crucially involves a return of many to the proletarian condition which they had more or less escaped, given that insecurity is precisely the heart of the “proletarian condition”). This process is contemporary with an increased mobility of capital and also humans, and so it takes place across borders. But, seen historically, it can also be distrib- uted among several political varieties:¶• in the “North,” it involves a partial or deep dismantling of the social policies and the institutions of social citizenship created by the welfare state, what I call the “national social state,” and therefore also a violent transition from welfare to workfare, from the social state to the penal state (the US showing the way in this respect, as has been convincingly argued by Loïc Wacquant12);¶ • in the “South,” it involves destroying and inverting the “developmental” programs and policies, which admittedly did not suffice to produce “take-off,” but indicated a way to resist impoverishment;¶ • in the “semi-periphery,” to borrow Wallerstein’s category, it was connected with the collapse of the dictatorial structure called “real existing socialism,” which was based on scarcity and corruption, but again kept the polarization of riches and poverty within certain limits.¶ Let me suggest that a common formal feature of all these processes that result in the reproletarianization of the labor-force is the fact that they suppress or mini- mize the forms and possibilities of representation of the subaltern within the state apparatus itself, or, if you prefer, the possibilities of more or less effective counter-power. With this remark I want to emphasize the political aspect of processes which, in the first instance, seem to be mainly “economic.”

#### This debate is about competing methodologies. The question at the end of the debate is whose ethical orientation best catalyzes political organization against Capital. Vote negative to affirm the Communist Hypothesis as a prerequisite to political or personal calculations, which ensure that discussions in debate continue to operate from within a broader framework of capitalistic competition

Badiou 2009 (Alain, Prof. @ European Graduate … ,*The Meaning of Sarkozy*, pgs. 97-103 bb)

I would like to situate the Sarkozy episode, which is not an impressive page in French history, in a broader horizon. Let us picture a kind of Hegelian fresco of recent world history - by which I do not, like our journalists, mean the triad Mitterrand-Chirac-Sarkozy, but rather the development of the politics of working-class and popular emancipation over nearly two centuries.¶Since the French Revolution and its gradually universal echo, since the most radically egalitarian developments of that revolution, the decrees of Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety on the 'maximum' and Babeuf's theoriza­ tions, we know (when I say 'we', I mean humanity in the abstract, and the knowledge in question is universally available on the paths of emancipation) that communum u the right hypothuu. Indeed, there is no other, or at least I am not aware of one. All those who abandon this hypothesis immediately resign themselves to the market economy, to parliamentary democracy - the form of state suited to capitalism - and to the inevitable and 'natural' character of the most monstrous inequalities.¶What do we mean by 'communism'? As Marx argued in the 1844ManUJcriptJ, communism is an idea regarding the destiny of the human species. This use of the word must be completely distinguished from the meaning of the adjective 'communist' that is so worn-out today, in such expressions as 'communist parties', 'communist states' or 'communist world' - never mind that 'communist state' is an oxymoron, to which the obscure coinage 'socialist state' has wisely been preferred. Even if, as we shall see, these uses of the word belong to a time when the hypothesis was still coming-to-be.¶In its generic sense, 'communist' means first of all, in a negative sense - as we can read in its canonical text The CommunutManijeJto - that the logic of classes, ofthefunda­ mental subordination of people who actually work for a dominant class, can be overcome. This arrangement, which has been that of history ever since antiquity, is not ipevitable. Consequently, the oligarchic power of those who possess wealth and organize its circulation, crystallized in the might of states, is not inescapable. The communist hypothesis is that a different collective organization is practicable, one that will eliminate the inequality ofwealth and even the division of labour: every individual will be a 'multi-purpose worker', and in particular people will circulate between manual and intellectual work, as well as between town and country. The private appropriation of monstrous fortunes and their transmission by inheritance will disappear. The existence of a coercive state separate from civil society, with its military and police, will no longer seem a self-evident necessity. There will be, Marx tells us - and he saw this point as his major contribution - after a brief sequence of 'proletarian dictatorship' charged with destroying the remains of the old world, a long sequence of reorganization on the basis of a 'free association' of producers and creators, which will make possible a 'with­ ering away' of the state.¶'Communism' as such only denotes this very general set of intellectual representations. This set is the horizon of any initiative, however local and limited in time it may be, that breaks with the order of established opinions - the necessity of inequalities and the state instrument for protect­ ing these - and composes a fragment of a politics of emancipation. In other words, communism is what Kant called an 'Idea', with a regulatory function, rather than a programme. It is absurd to characterize communist principles in the sense I have defined them here as utopian, as is so often done. They are intellectual patterns, always actualized in a different fashion, that serve to produce lines of demarcation between different forms of politics. By and large, a particular political sequence is either compatible with these principles or opposed to them, in which case it is reactionary. 'Communism', in this sense, is a heuristic hypothesis that is very frequently used in political argument,¶even if the word itself does not appear. If it is still true, as Sartre said, that 'every anti-communist is a swine', it is because any political sequence that, in its principles or lack of them, stands in formal contradiction with the communist hypothesis in its generic sense, has to be judged as opposed¶ to the emancipation of the whole of humanity, and thus to the properly human destiny of humanity. Whoever does not illuminate the coming-to-be of humanity with the communist hypothesis - whatever words they use, as such words matter little - reduces humanity, as far as its collective becoming is concerned, to animality. As we know, the contemporary - that is, the capitalist name of this animality - is 'competition'. The war dictated by self-interest, and nothing more.¶As a pure Idea of equality, the communist hypothesis has no doubt existed in a practical state since the beginnings of the existence of the state. As soon as mass action opposes state coercion in the name of egalitarian justice, we have the appearance of rudiments or fragments of the communist hypothesis. This is why, in a pamphlet titled De l'uJeologie, which I wrote in collaboration with the late lamented Fran<;oisBalmes and was published in 1976, we proposed to identifY 'communist invariants'.2 Popular revolts, such as that of the slaves led by Spartacus, or that of the German peasants led by Thomas Munzer, are examples of this practical existence of communist invariants.¶ However, in the explicit form that it was given by certain thinkers and activists of the French Revolution, the commu­ nist hypothesis inaugurates political modernity. It was this that laid low the mental structures of the ancien regime, yet without being tied to those 'democratic' political forms that the bourgeoisie would make the instrument for its own pursuit of power. This point is essential: from the beginning, the communist hypothesis in no way coincided with the 'democratic' hypothesis that would lead to present-day parliamentarism. It subsumes a different history and different events. What seems important and creative when illuminated by the communist hypothesis is different in kind from what bourgeois-democratic historiography selects. That is indeed why Marx, giving materialist foundations to the first effective great sequence of the modern politics of emancipation, both took over the word 'communism' and distanced himself from any kind of democratic 'politicism' by maintaining, after the lesson of the Paris Commune, that the bourgeois state, no matter how democratic, must be destroyed.¶Well, I leave it to you to judge what is important or not, to judge the points whose consequences you choose to assume against the horizon of the communist hypothesis. Once again, it is the right hypothesis, and we can appeal to its principles, whatever the declensions or variations that these undergo in different contexts.¶Sartre said in an interview, which I paraphrase: If the communist hypothesis is not right, if it is not practicable, well, that means that humanity is not a thing in itself, not very different from ants or termites. What did he mean by that? If competition, the 'free market', the sum of little pleasures, and the walls that protect you from the desire of the weak, are the alpha and omega of all collective and private existence, then the human animal is not worth a cent.¶And it is this worthlessness to which Bush with his aggressive conservatism and crusader spirit, Blair the Pious with his militarist rhetoric, and Sarkozy with his 'work, family, country' discipline, want to reduce the existence of the immense majority of living individuals. And the 'Left' is still worse, simply juxtaposing to this vacant violence a vague spirit of charity. To morbid competItIOn, the pasteboard¶ victories of daddy's boys and girls, the ridiculous supermen¶ of unleashed finance, the coked-up heroes of the planetary¶ stock exchange, this Left can only oppose the same actors¶ with a bit of social politeness, a little walnut oil in the wheels,¶crumbs of holy wafer for the disinherited - in other words,¶ borrowing from Nietzsche, the bloodless figure of the 'last man,.¶ To put an end once and for all to May '68 means agreeing that our only choice is between the hereditary nihilism of finance and social piety. It not only means accepting that communism collapsed in the Soviet Union, not only acknowledging that the PartiCommuniste Fran<;ais has been wretchedly defeated, but also and above all it means abandoning the hypothesis that May '68 was a militant invention precisely aware ofthe failure ofstate 'communism'. And thus that May '68, and still more so the five years that followed, inaugurated a new sequence for the genuine communist hypothesis, one that always keeps its distance from the state. Certainly, no one could say where all this might lead, but we knew in any case that what was at stake was the rebirth of this hypothesis.¶If the thing that Sarkozy is the name of succeeds in imposing the necessity of abandoning any idea of a rebirth of this kind, if human society is a collection of individuals pursuing their self-interest, if this is the eternal reality, then it is certain that the philosopher can and must abandon the human animal to its sad destiny.¶ But we shall not let a triumphant Sarkozy dictate the meaning of our existence, or the tasks of philosophy. For what we are witnessing in no way imposes such a renunciation of the communist hypothesis, but simply a consideration of the moment at which we find ourselves in the history of this hypothesis.

#### This round is key – every act of discussion must be understoo0d as a point of metaphoric condensation for Communism. Voting negative means the assuming with full ethical force that the battle is already won.

**BADIOU2010** [ALAIN, The Communist Hypothesis Translated by David Macey and Steve Corcoran 2010 p 252-257

Let's recapitulate as simply as possible. A truth is the political real. History, even as a reservoir of proper names, is a symbolic place. The ideological operation of the Idea of communism is the imaginary projection of the political real into the symbolic fiction of History, including in its guise as a representation of the action of innumerable masses via the One of a proper name. The role of this Idea is to support the individual's incorporation into the discipline of a truth procedure, to authorize the individual, in his or her own eyes, to go beyond the Statist constraints of mere survival by becoming a part of the body-of-truth, or the subjectivizable body. We will now ask: why is it necessary to resort to this ambiguous operation? Why do the event and its consequences also have to be exposed in the guise of a fact - often a violent one that IS accompanied by different versions of the 'cult of personality'? What is the reason for this historical appropriation of emancipatory politics? The simplest reason is that ordinary history, the history of individual lives, is confined within the State. The history of a life, with neither decision nor choice, is in itself a part of the history of the State, whose conventional mediations are the family, work, the homeland, property, religion, customs and so forth. The heroic, but individual, projection of an exception to all the above - as is a truth procedure - also aims at being shared with everyone else; it aims to show itself to be not only an exception but also a possibility that everyone can share from now on. And that is one of the Idea's functions: to project the exception into the ordinary life of individuals, to fill what merely exists with a certain mea'mre of the extraordinary. To convince my own immediate circle - husband or wife, neighbours and friends, colleagues - that the fantastic exception of truths in the making also exists, that we are not doomed to lives programmed by the constraints of the State. Naturally, in the final analysis, only the raw, or militant, experience of the truth procedure will compel one person or another's entry into the bodyoftruth. But to take him or her to the place where this experience is to be found - to make him or her a spectator of, and therefore partly a participant in, what is important for a truth the mediation of the Idea, the sharing of the Idea, are almost always required. The Idea of communism (regardless of what name it might otherwise be given, which hardly matters: no Idea is definable by its name) is what enables a truth procedure to be spoken in the impure language of the State and thereby for the lines of force by virtue of which the State prescribes what is possible and what i s impossible to be shifted for a time. In this view of things, the most ordinary action is to take someone to a real political meeting, far from their home, far from their predetermined existential parameters, in a hostel of workers from Mali, for example, or at the gates of a factory. Once they have come to the place where politics is occurring, they will make a decision about whether to incorporate or withdraw.But in order for them to come to that place, the Idea and for two centuries, or perhaps since Plato, it has been the Idea of communism - must have already shifted them in the order of representations, of History and of the State. The symbol must imaginarily come to the aid of the creative flight from the real. Allegorical facts must ideologize and historicize the fragility of truth. A banal yet crucial discussion with four workers and a student in an ill-lit room must momentarily be enlarged to the dimensions of Communism and thus be both what it is and what it will have been as a moment in the local construction of the True. Through the enlargement of the symbol, it must become visible that 'just ideas' come from this practically invisible practice.The fiveperson meeting in an out-of-the-way suburb must be eternal in the very expression of its precariousness. That is why the real must be exposed in a fictional structure.

#### We must have the courage to reinvent and remain faith to the idea of communism. The world of the status quo is not necessary and should be abolished. This radical starting point is good enough to create possibilities for new politics

**BADIOU2010** [ALAIN, The Communist Hypothesis Translated by David Macey and Steve Corcoran 2010 p 62-67

Having closed that parenthesis, we can say that we are still struggling with the difficult questions raised by May '68. We are the contemporaries of '68 from the point of view of politics, the definition of politics, and the organized future of politics. I therefore use the word 'contemporary' in the strongest possible sense. Of course, the world has changed, and of course categories have changed. The categories 'student th" k ' d " h' you , workers an peasants now mean sometlng different, and the union and party organizations of those days are now in ruins. But we have the same problem, and are the contemporaries of the problem revealed by May '68: the classical figure of the politics of emancipation was ineffective. Those of us who were politically active in the 1 960s and 1970s did not need the collapse of the USSR to teach us that. Countless new things have been experimented with, tried out and tested both in theory and in the practices that are dialectically bound up with it. And it still goes on thanks to the energy of a handful of activists, intellectuals and workers - and no distinction is made between them - who appear to be working in isolation. They are the guardians of the future and they are inventing the future. But it cannot be said that the problem has been resolved: what new forms of political organization are needed to handle political antagonisms? As in science, until such time as the problem has not been resolved, you have all sorts of discoveries stimulated by the search for a solution. Sometimes, and for the same reason, whole new theories see the light of day, but the problem itself is still there. We can define our contemporaneity with May '68 in similar terms. It is another way of talking about our fidelity to May '68. The decisive issue is the need to cling to the historical hypothesis of a world that has been freed from the law of profit and private interest - even while we are, at the level of intellectual representations, still prisoners of the conviction that we cannot do away with it, that this is the way of the world, and that no politics of emancipation is possible. That is what I propose to call the communist hypothesis. It is in fact mainly negative, as it is safer and more important to say that the existing world is not necessary than it is to say, when we have nothing to go on, that a different world is possible. This is a question of modal logic: how, in political terms, can we move from non-necessity to possibility?Because quite simply, if we accept the inevitability of the unbridled capitalist economy and the parliamentary politics that supports it, then we quite simply cannot see the other possibilities that are inherent in the situation in which we find ourselves. Second, we have to try to retain the words of our language, even though we no longer dare to say them out loud. In '68, these were the words that were used by everyone. Now they tell us: 'The world has changed, so you can no longer use those words, and you know that it WIL'S the language of illusions and terror.' 'Oh yes, we can! And we must!' The problem is still there, and that means that we must be able to pronounce those words. It is up to us to criticise them, and to give them a new meaning. We must be able to go on saying 'people', 'workers', 'abolition of private property', and so on, without being considered has-beens, and without considering ourselves as has-beens. We have to discuss these words in our own field, in our own camp. We have to put an end to the linguistic terrorism that delivers us into the hands of our enemies. Giving up on the language issue, and accepting the terror that subjectively forbids us to pronounce words that offend dominant sensibilities, is an intolerable form of oppression. And finally, we have to realize that all politics is organized, and that the most difficult question is probably that of what type of organization we need. We can resolve it through the multifaceted experiments that begin in '68. For the classic party dispositif, and its social supports, the most important 'battles' were in fact electoral battles, and that is a doctrine that has given all it can give. It is worn out and no longer works, despite the great things it was able to achieve or promote between 1900 and 1960. We have to discuss our fidelity to May '68 on two levels. At the ideological and historical level, we should draw up our own balance sheet for the twentieth century, so that we can reformulate the emancipation hypothesis in contemporary terms, now that the socialist states have failed. And we also know that new local experiments and political battles are going on, and that they will provide the backdrop that will create these new forms of organization. This combination of complex ideological and historical work, and theoretical and practical data about new forms of political organization, is the defining feature of our times. I would readily describe this as the era of the reformulation of the communist hypothesis. Then what is the virtue that means most to us? You know that the revolutionaries of 1 792-94 used the word 'virtue'. Saint-Just asked the crucial question: 'What do those who want neither virtue nor terror want?' His answer was that they wanted corruption. And that indeed is what today's world asks of us: to accept the wholesale corruption of minds under the yoke of commodities and money. The main political virtue we need to fight that now is courage. Not only courage when we face the police - though we will certainly find that - but the courage to defend and practice our ideas and principles, to say what we think, what we want, and what we are doing.To put it in a nutshell: we have to be bold enough to have an idea.A great idea.We have to convince ourselves that there is nothing ridiculous or criminal about having a great idea. The world of global and arrogant capitalism in which we live is taking us back to the 1840s and the birth of capitalism. Its imperative, as formulated by Guizot, was: 'Get rich!' We can translate that as 'Live without an idea!' We have to say that we cannot live without an idea. We have to say: 'Have the courage to support the idea, and it can only be the communist idea in its generic sense.' That is why we must remain the contemporaries of May '68. In its own way, it tells us that living without an idea is intolerable. And then a long and terrible resignation set in. Too many people now think that there is no alternative to living for oneself, for one's own interests. Let us have the courage to cut ourselves off from such people. I am a philosopher, so let me tell you something that has been said again and again since Plato's day. It is very simple. I am telling you as a philosopher that we have to live with an idea, and that what deserves to be called a real politics begins with that conviction.

#### Our ethico-political obligation is to assume responsibility for our actions. Capitalism render’s its victims anonymous and ensures that the aff’s personal focus never come to terms with the billions of degraded life choices globally—our epitstemological position is a PREREQUISITE to understanding the full extent of accessibility concerns.

Slavoj Zizek and Glyn Daly, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, 2004, Conversations With Zizek, p. 14-16

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gord­ian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subju­gated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture — with all its pieties con­cerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette — Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedevilled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political mor­bidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffe, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of im­plicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibi­tion conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economismwe should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight thatin order to create a uni­versal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its constructionthrough a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is thatthe gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s population. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its out­comes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgement in a neutral marketplace. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diver­sity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and name­less (viz, the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’. And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is mag­nified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differ­ential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sus­tained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against thisZizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-par­ticular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or to reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

### Case

#### The 1AC’s performance of the war machine enacts a military mentality – forecloses comprehensive problematization

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 22-23)

The widespread, unquestioning acceptance of warism and the corresponding reluctance to consider pacifism as a legitimate option make it difficult to propose a genuine consideration of pacifist alternatives. Warism may be held implicitly or explicitly. Held in its implicit form, it does not occur to the warist to challenge the view that war is morally justified; war is taken to be natural and normal. No other way of understanding large-scale human conflict even comes to mind. In this sense warism is like racism, sexism, and homophobia: a prejudicial bias built into conceptions and judgments without the awareness of those assuming it. In its explicit form, warism is openly accepted, articulated, and deliberately chosen as a value judgment on nations in conflict. War may be defended as essential for justice, needed for national security, as “the only thing the enemy understands,” and so on. In both forms warism misguides judgments and institutions by reinforcing the necessity and inevitability of war and precluding alternatives. Whether held implicitly or explicitly, warism obstructs questioning the conceptual framework of the culture. If we assume (without realizing it) that war itself is morally justifiable, our moral considerations of war will be focused on whether a particular war is justified or whether particular acts within a given war are morally acceptable. These are important concerns, but addressing them does not get at the fundamental issue raised by the pacifist: the morality of war as such. In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer explains that “war is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt.”8 The pacifist suggestion is that there is a third judgment of war that must be made prior to the other two: might war, by its very nature, be morally wrong? This issue is considered by Walzer only as an afterthought in an appendix, where it is dismissed as naïve. Perhaps Walzer should not be faulted for this omission, since he defines his task as describing the conventional morality of war and, as has been argued above, conventional morality does take warism for granted. To this extent Walzer is correct. And this is just the point: our warist conceptual frameworks— our warist normative lenses— blind us to the root question. The concern of pacifists is to expose the hidden warist bias and not merely describe cultural values. Pacifists seek to examine cultural values and recommend what they ought to be. This is why the pacifist insists on judging war in itself, a judgment more fundamental than the more limited assessments of the morality of a given war or the morality of specific acts within a particular war.

#### This mindset is important – our consciousness of war guarantees endless violence that ensures planetary destruction and structural violence

* Another impact: freeing ourselves from war = more resources for peace

Lawrence 9 (Grant, “Military Industrial "War" Consciousness Responsible for Economic and Social Collapse,” OEN—OpEdNews, March 27)

As a presidential candidate, [Barack Obama](http://obama.senate.gov/) called [Afghanistan](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Afghanistan_%282001%E2%80%93present%29) ''the war we must win.'' He was absolutely right. Now it is time to win it... Senators [John McCain](http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0564587/) and Joseph Lieberman [calling](http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/inbox/story/960269.html) for an expanded war in Afghanistan "How true it is that war can destroy everything of value." Pope Benedict XVI [decrying](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iuue8kE-e0lYZVFpt4RlbX4M_IEw) the suffering of Africa Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years. Lao Tzu on [War](http://www.sacred-texts.com/tao/salt/salt09.htm) As Americans we are raised on the utility of war to conquer every problem. We have a drug problem so we wage war on it. We have a cancer problem so we wage war on it. We have a crime problem so we wage war on it. Poverty cannot be dealt with but it has to be warred against. Terror is another problem that must be warred against. In the [United States](http://maps.google.com/maps?ll=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667&spn=10.0,10.0&q=38.8833333333,-77.0166666667%20%28United%20States%29&t=h), solutions can only be found in terms of wars. In a society that functions to support a massive military industrial war machine and empire, it is important that the terms promoted support the conditioning of its citizens. We are conditioned to see war as the solution to major social ills and major political disagreements. That way when we see so much of our resources devoted to war then we don't question the utility of it. The term "war" excites mind and body and creates a fear mentality that looks at life in terms of attack. In war, there has to be an attack and a must win attitude to carry us to victory. But is this war mentality working for us? In an age when nearly half of our tax money goes to support the war machine and a good deal of the rest is going to support the elite that control the war machine, we can see that our present war mentality is not working. Our values have been so perverted by our war mentality that we see sex as sinful but killing as entertainment. Our society is dripping violence. The violence is fed by poverty, social injustice, the break down of family and community that also arises from economic injustice, and by the managed media. The cycle of violence that exists in our society exists because it is useful to those that control society. It is easier to sell the war machine when your population is conditioned to violence. Our military industrial consciousness may not be working for nearly all of the life of the planet but it does work for the very few that are the master manipulators of our values and our consciousness. Rupert Murdoch, the media monopoly man that runs the "Fair and Balanced" [Fox Network](http://www.fox.com/), Sky Television, and [News Corp](http://www.newscorp.com/) just to name a few, [had](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rupert_Murdoch) all of his 175 newspapers editorialize in favor of the [Iraq war](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_War). Murdoch snickers when [he says](http://www.newscorpse.com/ncWP/?p=341) "we tried" to manipulate public opinion." The Iraq war was a good war to Murdoch [because,](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/07/b122948.html) "The death toll, certainly of Americans there, by the terms of any previous war are quite minute." But, to the media manipulators, the phony politicos, the military industrial elite, a million dead Iraqis are not to be considered. War is big business and it is supported by a war consciousness that allows it to prosper. That is why more war in Afghanistan, the war on Palestinians, and the other wars around the planet in which the [military industrial complex](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military-industrial_complex) builds massive wealth and power will continue. The military industrial war mentality is not only killing, maiming, and destroying but it is also contributing to the present social and economic collapse. As mentioned previously, the massive wealth transfer that occurs when the American people give half of their money to support death and destruction is money that could have gone to support a just society. It is no accident that after years of war and preparing for war, our society is crumbling. Science and technological resources along with economic and natural resources have been squandered in the never-ending pursuit of enemies. All of that energy could have been utilized for the good of humanity, ¶ instead of maintaining the power positions of the very few super wealthy. So the suffering that we give is ultimately the suffering we get. Humans want to believe that they can escape the consciousness that they live in. But that consciousness determines what we experience and how we live. As long as we choose to live in "War" in our minds then we will continue to get "War" in our lives. When humanity chooses to wage peace on the world then there will be a flowering of life. But until then we will be forced to live the life our present war consciousness is creating.

#### Controls the potential of the method – we need to free ourselves of the presumption towards war and advocate for peace and social justice to stop the flow of militarism that threatens existence

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Where, then, does the future lie? Unilateralism, hegemonic political anarchy, mass immiseration, ecocide, and global violence—a Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes? Or international cooperation, social justice, and genuine collective—political and human—security? Down which path lies cowering, fragile hope?¶ Humanistic thinkers approach these problems from the perspective of their concern about the situation of individuals and the long-range interests of humanity. They examine in depth the root causes of these problems, warning about the consequences of escalation and, at the same time, indicating the prospect of their possible solutions through nonviolent means and a growing global consciousness. Today's world is in desperate need of realistic alternatives to violent conflict. Nonviolent action—properly planned and executed—is a powerful and effective force for political and social change. The ideas of peace and nonviolence, as expressed by Immanuel Kant, Leo Tolstoy, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many contemporary philosophers—supported by peace and civil rights movements—counter the paralyzing fear with hope and offer a realistic alternative: a rational approach to the solutions to the problems, encouraging people to be the masters of their own destiny.¶ Fortunately, the memory of the tragedies of war and the growing realization of this new existential situation of humanity has awakened the global conscience and generated protest movements demanding necessary changes. During the four decades of the Cold War, which polarized the world, power politics was challenged by the common perspective of humanity, of the supreme value of human life, and the ethics of peace. Thus, in Europe, which suffered from both world wars and totalitarianism, spiritual-intellectual efforts to find solutions to these problems generated ideas of "new thinking," aiming for peace, freedom, and democracy. Today, philosophers, intellectuals, progressive political leaders, and peace-movement activists continue to promote a peaceful alternative. In the asymmetry of power, despite being frustrated by war-prone politics, peaceful projects emerge each time, like a phoenix arising from the ashes, as the only viable alternative for the survival of humanity. The new thinking in philosophy affirms the supreme value of human and nonhuman life, freedom, justice, and the future of human civilization. It asserts that the transcendental task of the survival of humankind and the rest of the biotic community must have an unquestionable primacy in comparison to particular interests of nations, social classes, and so forth. In applying these principles to the nuclear age, it considers a just and lasting peace as a categorical imperative for the survival of humankind, and thus proposes a world free from nuclear weapons and from war and organized violence.44 In tune with the Charter of the United Nations, it calls for the democratization of international relations and for dialogue and cooperation in order to secure peace, human rights, and solutions to global problems. It further calls for the transition toward a cosmopolitan order.¶ The escalating global problems are symptoms of what might be termed a contemporary civilizational disease, developed over the course of centuries, in which techno-economic progress is achieved at the cost of depersonalization and dehumanization. Therefore, the possibility of an effective "treatment" today depends on whether or not humankind will be able to regain its humanity, thus establishing new relations of the individual with himself or herself, with others, and with nature. Hence the need for a new philosophy of humanity and an ethics of nonviolence and planetary co-responsibility to help us make sense not only of our past historical events, but also of the extent, quality, and urgency of our present choices.

#### All of these link arguments prove their method can’t solve – try or die for the alt

**Zizek 1999** [Slavoj, Senior Researcher at Institute for Social Studies, Ljubliana, *The Ticklish Subject: the absent centre of political ontology*, New York: Verso, 1999, 186]

Crucial for a successful Ideology is thus the tension within its particular content between the themes and motifs that belong to the `oppressed'and those which belong to the `oppressors': ruling ideas are never directly the ideas of the ruling class. Let us take what is arguably the ultimate example Christianity - how did it become the ruling ideology? By incorporating a series of motifs and aspirations of the oppressed (truth is on the side of the suffering and humiliated; power corrupts...) and re rticulating them in such a way that they became compatible with the existing relations of domination.And the same holds even for Fascism.The fundamental ideological contradiction of Fascism is that between organicism and mechanicism: the corporatist-organic aestheticized vision of the Social Body and the extreme `technologization', mobilization, destruction, wiping-out, of the last vesties of `organic' communities families, universities, local self-management traditions) at the level of the actual `micro-practices' of the power exercise. In Fascism, the aestheticized organicist corporate ideology is thus the very form of an unprecedented technological mobilization of society which disrupts `organic' links.15 This paradox enables us to avoid the liberal-multiculturalist trap of condemning every call for a return to organic (ethnic, etc.)links as `proto-Fascist': what defines Fascism is, rather, a specific combination of organicist corporatism and the drive to ruthless modernization. To put it in yet another way: in every actual Fascism, one always encounters elements which make us say `This is not yet full-blown Fascism; there are still inconsistent elements of leftist traditions or liberalism in it'; however, this removal from - this distance towards - the phantom of `pure' Fascism is Fascism tout court `Fascism', in its ideology and practice, is nothing but a certain formal principle of distortion of social antagonism, a certain logic of its displacement by a combination and condensation of inconsistent attitudes.

# 2NC

## Case

### Overview

#### Reject the affirmative’s methodology – the enunciation of the war machine is a devastating drawback to the 1ac – the judge should not endorse a methodology as problematic as the war machine. The affirmative’s method leads to 1) paranoiac exclusive segregating of movements and reaffirmation of structures of power, and 2) fascist pathways of death where their method ends up violently turning them away from their supporters and outlashing against everyone around them – the impact is mass scale failure and extreme violence without purpose.

**Diken and Laustsen 2001** (Bülent, lecturer in Sociology at Lancaster University, and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, Ph.D. student at the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Sciences, “Enjoy your fight!” – “Fight Club” as a symptom of the Network Society, <http://www.lancs.ac.uk/fass/sociology/papers/diken-laustsen-enjoy-your-fight.pdf> )

In his Programme from 1936 and his analysis of fascism, Bataille concludes that there is much the Left can learn from the organizational forms of fascism (Bataille 1997, 1997b; Sørensen 2001). “Assume the function of destruction and decomposition.... Take part in the destruction of the existing world... Fight for the decomposition ... of all communities...” (Bataille 1997: 121). Fight Club, too, seeks “a prematurely induced dark age1⁄4. The complete and right-away destruction of civilization.” (Palahniuk 1997: 125). Bataille had argued that it is necessary to affirm the “value of violence” and “to take upon oneself perversion and crime” (1997: 121); and Fight Club, again, violently lifts the curse: “yes, you’re going to have to kill someone1⁄4. No excuses and no lies1⁄4. You are the same decaying organic matter as everyone else” (Palahniuk 1997: 125, 134). Fight Club wants the whole world to “hit the bottom” (Ibid. 123). Echoing the French nouveaux philosophes, especially the Situationist manifesto, it especially attacks the society of spectacle. “Fight club isn’t about words ... Fight club is not football on television. You aren’t watching a bunch of men you don’t know halfway around the world beating on each other live by satellite with a two-minute delay” (Ibid. 50, 51). Fight Club is about street fights, urban anarchism, and strategies of subversion. ¶ “Realize ... the irony of the animal world”, continues Bataille’s Programme (1997: 121). In his imagination, Jack walks up the entrance of a cave and out comes a penguin. “Slide”, it says, smiling. “Without any effort, we slid through tunnels and galleries” (Palahniuk 1997: 20). It is no coincidence that the social space, in which Jack/penguin “slides”, is a smooth social space. Losing the social bond is freedom, and in this sense Fight Club is a Deleuzian “war machine”, a free assemblage oriented along a line of flight out of the repressive social machinery. It is that which cannot be contained in the striated, rigidly segmented social space; it consists of flows (speed), operates in a smooth space, and unties the social bond (codes) in multiplicity (mass-phenomena). In this respect “war”, or “fight”, is the surest mechanism against social organization: “just as Hobbes saw clearly that the State was against war, so war is against the State, and makes it impossible” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 357). It is crucial in this context that Deleuze and Guattari recognize a war machine as an assemblage that has as its object not war—war is only “the supplement” of the war machine—but the constitution of a creative line of flight, a smooth space. War is simply “a social state that wards off the State” (Ibid. 417). In this sense, violence is Fight Club’s supplement, not necessarily its object; Fight Club is above all a social state that wards off “society”. Fight Club proliferates in, or even better, constructs a nomadic social space without zones, centres, segments: a flattened space, in which one can “slide” through connections: “and” ... “and” ... “and”. Lines rather than points; connection rather than conjugation. Fight Club does not have a fixed spatiality, a permanent address; it grows like a rhizome, thorough discontinuous jumps. And temporally, it “exists only in the hours between when fight club starts and when fight club ends” (Palahniuk 1997: 48). ¶ Fight Club is a film about mobility and mobilization. However, it depicts mobility as a paradoxical topic. “You wake up at Air Harbor International.... You wake up at O’Hare. You wake up at LaGuardia. You wake up at Logan.... you wake up and have to ask where you are.... You wake up, and you’re nowhere” (Ibid. 25, 33). Jack’s extreme geographical mobility leads to “inertia” à la Virilio’s theory (2000). Yet Fight Club’s nomadism is not (only) geographical mobility. It is, rather, a nomadism in the Deleuzian sense, which is related to deviation, however slowly, from fixation and linear movement (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 371). It is by staying non-socialized, by deviation, and not necessarily by physical movement, that the nomad creates his own space. That is, Fight Club’s nomadism is also spiritual: “keep moving, never stop moving, motionless voyage, desubjectification” (1987: 159). A sort of metaphysical mobility, a schizophrenic connectionism, in search of new possibilities that are to (be)come. “Let the chips fall where they may”, says Fight Club. ¶ As a whole, the film Fight Club constantly makes use of a schizo-logic. For instance, the motif of “decomposition” throughout the movie is a double reference to the post-structuralist French philosophy and to post-apocalyptic primitivism à la The Planet of the Apes and 12 Monkeys. The film is both a commercial blockbuster and a critique of consumer society. It demonstrates both modernist techniques (e.g. flashbacks-in-flashbacks, Brechtian epic cuts in which the narrator directly addresses the audience by breaking dramatic illusions, and so on) and pop- art. It is simultaneously loaded with motifs of the Christ (e.g. fights take place in parking lots and basements as the early Christian meetings in caves) and Nietzschean motifs of the anti- Christ. It refers both to the Frankfurt style pessimism/elitism (may I never be content, deliver me from...) and mass movement (fascism), and so on. Fight Club is both violence and comedy, both popular culture and avantgarde art, both philosophy and pop-philosophy at the same time, in the same schizophrenic package. As a commentator put it, “for all its revolutionary, fuck-it-up fervor Fight Club’s dirty little secret is it’s one of the best comedies of the decade. Forget the blood, the explosions, the Nietzschean verbal jousting, the weird gender mutation ... this is some funny, subversive stuff” (Savlov 2000).¶ Microfascism¶ Lines of flight, emphasise Deleuze and Guattari, are neither good nor bad in themselves; they are open-ended processes. There is not a dichotomy between schizophrenia and paranoia, between the rhizome and the tree, between the strata and lines of flight. And then it is not enough to be against the strata, to oppose the strata (organization) and the lines of flight (becoming body without organs) to one another. Lines of flight have their own dangers, which are interesting in relation to Fight Club.¶ The first danger is that a line of flight can become re-stratified: in the fear of complete destratification, rigid segmentation and segregation may seem attractive. Whenever a line of flight is stopped by an organization, institution, interpretation, a black hole, etc., a “reterritorialization” takes place. In spite of the fact that Fight Club makes a mockery of an “illusion of safety” in the beginning, its line of flight is followed by reterritorialization. It evolves into a project, Project Mayhem. Becoming a “bureaucracy of anarchy” (Palahniuk 1997: 119), Project Mayhem is the point at which Fight Club reterritorializes as “the paranoid position of the mass subject, with all the identifications of the individual with the group, the group with the leader, and the leader with the group” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 34). In comparison with Fight Club, Project Mayhem is centralised around Jack/Tyler who gives the multiplicity of lines of escape a resonance. Methods change too: “We have to show these men and women freedom by enslaving them, and show them courage by frightening them” (Ibid. 149). The new rules are: “you don’t ask questions”; “you have to trust Tyler”, and so on (Ibid. 125). Fight Club was a gang, Project Mayhem is more like an army. Fight Club produces a microcosm of the affections of the rigid: it deterritorializes, massifies, but only in order to stop deterritorialization, to invent new territorializations.¶ The second danger of the line of flight, which is less obvious but more interesting is “clarity”. Clarity arises when one attains a perception of the molecular texture of the “social”, when the holes in it are revealed. What used to be compact and whole seems now to be leaking, a texture that enables de-differentiations, overlappings, migrations, hybridizations. Clarity emerges with the transformation of Fight Club into Project Mayhem. “Everything is nothing, and it’s cool to be enlightened” (Palahniuk 1997: 64). Clarity is also the reason why Fight Club fascinates its members. In this sense, Fight Club does not only reproduce the dangers of the rigid in a miniature scale; it is microfascism. “Instead of the great paranoid fear, we are trapped in a thousand little monomanias, self-evident truths, and clarities that gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of self-appointed judge, dispenser of the justice, policeman, neighbourhood SS man” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 228).¶ Interestingly, whereas the movie clearly makes a self-reflexive mockery of Project Mayhem in the context of the first danger (macrofascism), the aspects of Fight Club that do not resonate in Project Mayhem (that is, its microfascist aspects) escape its ironic perspective. It seems as if the movie assumes that power predominantly pertains to molar lines. But lines of flight are not exempted from power relations, and there is a microfascism in Fight Club that cannot be confined to Project Mayhem. It is in this context remarkable that Fight Club operates as a deterritorialized line of flight, as a war machine that is violently opposed to the state; its members are not merely the Oedipalized paranoiacs of the capitalist state order. Its micro- fascism can be understood best as a transgressive delirium. “What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement”, a proliferation of molecular interactions, “skipping from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 214-5). If Project Mayhem is the ridiculous Nazi-type organization with unreflexive skinheads who just repeat Tyler’s orders, Fight Club is the molecular face of fascism.¶ The third danger: a line of flight can lose its creative potentials and become a line of death. This is precisely what happens in Fight Club: “the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion for abolition” (1987: 229). In fact, fascism is the result of an intense line of flight that becomes a line of death, wanting self-destruction and “death through the death of others” (Ibid. 230). A line of flight that desires its own repression. The point at which escape becomes a line of death is the point at which war (destruction) becomes the main object of the war machine rather than its supplement. Fight Club, transforming into Project Mayhem, becomes an instrument of pure destruction and violence, of complete destratification, a war machine that has war as its object. In other words, the regression to the undifferentiated or complete disorganization is as dangereous as transcendence and organization. Tyler, the alluring and charismatic, the free- wheeling pervert of Fight Club, is as dangerous as society. If there are two dangers, the strata and complete destratification, suicide, Fight Club fights only the first. Therefore a relevant question, never asked by microfascists, is whether it is not “necessary to retain a minimum of strata, a minimum of forms and functions, a minimal subject from which to extract materials, affects, and assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 270). The test of desire is not denouncing false desires but distinguishing between that which pertains to the strata, complete destratification, and that which pertains to line of flight, a test, which Fight Club does not pass (Ibid. 165). Let’s qualify this point by investigating the way the logic of the cut works in the film.

### Militarism method

#### 2. The entire defense of their method assumes they are winning the root cause debate – capitalism is the real root cause of systemic oppression and violence – hence, the justification for “war machine” tactics is lost

Labalme 2

(“Activism: Peace: NVCD: Discrimination”, http://www.activism.net/peace/nvcdh/discrimination.shtml; Jacob)

In this action, our struggle is not only against missiles and bombs, but against the system of power they defend: a system based on domination, on the belief that some people have more value than others, and therefore have the right to control others, to exploit them so that they can lead better lives than those they oppress.¶ We say that all people have value. No person, no group, has the right to wield power over the decisions and resources of others. The structure of our organizations and the processes we use among ourselves are our best attempt to live our belief in self-determination. Besides working against discrimination of all kinds among ourselves, we must try to understand how such discrimination supports the system which produces nuclear weapons.¶ For some people who come to this action, the overriding issue is the struggle to prevent nuclear destruction. For others, that struggle is not separate from the struggles against racism, sexism, classism, and the oppression of groups of people because of their sexual orientation, religion, age, physical (dis)ability, appearance, or life history. Understood this way, it is clear that nuclear weapons are already killing people, forcing them to lead lives of difficulty and struggle. Nuclear war has already begun, and it claims its victims disproportionately from native peoples, the Third World, women, and those who are economically vulnerable because of the history of oppression.¶ All oppressions are interlocking. We separate racism, classism, etc. in order to discuss them, not to imply that any form of oppression works in isolation. We know that to work against any one of these is not just to try to stop something negative, but to build a positive vision. Many in the movement call this larger goal feminism. Calling our process "feminist process" does not mean that women dominate or exclude men; on the contrary, it challenges all systems of domination. The term recognizes the historical importance of the feminist movement in insisting that nonviolence begins at home, in the ways we treat each other.¶ Confronting the issues that divide us is often painful. People may feel guilty, or hurt, or react defensively when we begin to speak of these things, as if they were being personally accused. But working through this pain together, taking responsibility for our oppressive behavior, is part of our struggle to end the nuclear arms race. Asking members of oppressed groups to be the catalyst for this change is avoiding our own responsibility for discrimination. Most of us benefit from some form of privilege due to our sex, or class, or skin color, or sexual orientation, but that privilege is limited. None of us alone has the power to end institutions of discrimination. Only when we struggle together can we hope to do so -- and when pain and hurt arise in that struggle, we can see it as a measure of the depth to which discrimination hurts us all, keeping us separated and divided in our strength.¶ Racism, Classism, Sexism, Heterosexism and Militarism¶ Part of struggling against nuclear weapons involves understanding the ways in which the oppression of particular groups of people supports militarism, makes the institutionalized system of war and violence appear "natural" and "inevitable." For instance, heterosexism, or the assumption that sexual relations are only permissible, desirable, and normal between opposite sexes, justifies a system of rigid sex roles, in which men and women are expected to behave and look in particular ways, and in which qualities attributed to women are devalued. Thus, men who are not willing to be violent are not virile -- they are threatened with the real sanctions placed on homosexuality (physical violence, housing and economic discrimination) unless they behave like "real men." The military relies upon homophobia (the fear of homosexuality) to provide it with willing enlistees, with soldiers who are trained to kill others to prove their masculinity.¶ Sexism, or the systematic devaluation of women, is clearly related to this. Women have traditionally opposed war because women bear the next generation and feel a responsiblity to protect it. But feminists are not content to speak only from traditional roles as mothers and nurturers. Many activists see a feminist analysis as crucial to effectively challenging militarism. The system of patriarchy, under which men benefit from the oppression of women, supports and thrives on war. In a sexist or patriarchal society, women are relegated to limited roles and valued primarily for their sexual and reproductive functions, while men are seen as the central makers of culture, the primary actors in history. Patriarchy is enforced by the language and images of our culture; by keeping women in the lowest paying and lowest status jobs, and by violence against women in the home and on the streets. Women are portrayed by the media as objects to be violated; 50% of women are battered by men in their lives, 75% are sexually assaulted.¶ The sexist splitting of humanity which turns women into others, lesser beings whose purpose is to serve men, is the same split which allows us to see our enemies as non-human, fair game for any means of destruction or cruelty. In war, the victors frequently rape the women of the conquered peoples. Our country's foreign policy often seems directed by teenage boys desparately trying to live up to stereotypes of male toughness, with no regard for the humanity or land of their "enemy." Men are socialized to repress emotions, to ignore their needs to nurture and cherish other people and the earth. Emotions, tender feelings, care for the living, and for those to come are not seen as appropriate concerns of public policy. This makes it possible for policymakers to conceive of nuclear war as "winnable."¶ Similarly, racism, or the institutionalized devaluation of darker peoples, supports both the idea and the practice of the military and the production of nuclear weapons. Racism operates as a system of divide and conquer. It helps to perpetuate a system in which some people consistently are "haves" and others are "have nots." Racism tries to make white people forget that all people need and are entitled to self-determination, good health care, and challenging work. Racism limits our horizons to what presently exists; it makes us suppose that current injustices are "natural," or it makes those injustices invisible. For example, most of the uranium used in making nuclear weapons is mined under incredibly hazardous conditions by people of color: Native Americans and black South Africans. Similarly, most radioactive and hazardous waste dumps are located on lands owned or occupied by people of color. If all those people suffering right now from exposure to nuclear materials were white, would nuclear production remain acceptable to the white-dominated power structure?¶ Racism also underlies the concept of "national security": that the U.S. must protect its "interests" in Third World countries through the exercise of military force and economic manipulation. In this world-view, the darker peoples of the world are incapable of managing their own affairs and do not have the right to self-determination. Their struggles to democratize their countries and become independent of U.S. military and economic institutions are portrayed as "fanatic," "terrorist," or "Communist." The greatest danger of nuclear war today lies in the likelihood of superpower intervention in Third World countries, fueled by government appeals to nationalistic and racist interests.¶ All forms of discrimination are interrelated with economic discrimination, or classism. Classism justifies a system in which competition is the norm, and profit is believed to be a universal motivation. Thus, poor and working class people lack access to education, leisure time and frequently basic things like food and shelter. But a classist society blames them for their poverty, or devalues their particular way of living. Classism values certain kinds of work over others, and sets up a system of unequal rewards. Our society threatens the majority of our members with economic insecurity, forcing us to accept things the way they are for fear of losing the few things we've gained through hard work. Since most poor people are women, children and people of color, classism and other forms of discrimination work together to hide the injustice of our economic system.¶ Poor and working class people feel the effects of the military directly, profoundly, and brutally. Vital social services have been cut to feed the Pentagon. Inflation, aggravated by the military budget, chews away at what is left after disproportionately high taxes are deducted from our pay. Poor people are prime military recruits, with historically little access to draft deferments or information about conscientious objection, forced by unemployment to think of the military as a "career opportunity." Our militarized society does not support cooperative and socially productive work, but counts on unequal competition and economic deprivation to provide workers in defense industries, miners in uranium mines, and soldiers in the armed forces.¶ No human being is born with discriminatory attitudes and beliefs. Physical and cultural attitudes are not the causes of oppression; these differences are used to justify oppression. Racist, classist, sexist, heterosexist, and all other forms of discriminatory attitudes are a mixture of misinformation and ignorance which have to be imposed on young people through a painful process of social conditioning. These processes are left unchallenged partially because people feel powerless to do anything about them. But the situation is not hopeless. People can grow and change. Many successful struggles have taken place against structures of exploitation and discrimination. We are not condemned to repeat the past. Discriminatory conditioning can be analyzed and unlearned.¶ All people come from traditions which have a history of resistance to injustice, and every person has their own individual history of resistance to discriminatory conditioning. This history needs to be recalled and celebrated, and people need to listen to and learn from other people's histories. When people act from a sense of informed pride in themselves and their own traditions, they will be more effective in all struggles for justice and peace.

#### The form outlives the content – warist persuasion rollsback the aff – outweighs other aspects and risks extinction

**Collins & Glover 2** (John, Assistant Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence University, Ross, Visiting Professor of Sociology at St. Lawrence University, Collateral Language, p. 6-7)

As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that language matters in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its use, by political and military leaders, leads directly to violence in the form of war, mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust, it will probably be because leaders in more than one country have succeeded in convincing their people, through the use of political language, that the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, is justifiable. From our perspective, then, every act of political violence—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—is intimately linked with the use of language. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “manufacturing consent” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the language that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, kills and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

### A2 Privilege

#### **The lenses with which we view war and peace influence the policy options we consider – academia is a critical space to break down the warism in our minds**

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 115-117)

The very notion of restraint in war— common to all positions along ¶ the full continuum in varying degrees— puts the burden of proof on going to war and on how the fighting is done. These are the activities in ¶ need of justification. The moral presumption should be to peace, positive peace, rather than the pervasive presumption of warism and negative peace. Recognizing the grip that warism has on dominant culture ¶ may be the most formidable task of genuine peacemaking for the fore-¶ seeable future because it is warism that blocks evolution toward more ¶ pacifistic societies. Only occasionally will individuals back into the ¶ most absolute form of pacifism; the cultural predisposition to warism ¶ confines most of us to a narrow range of options toward the war- realist ¶ end of the scale. This brings us full circle and we end this consideration of a moral continuum on the morality of war and peace where we ¶ began, confronting warism.¶ The normative lenses of warism, the spectacles through which we ¶ in modern culture tend to see and interpret all that happens, turn out ¶ to be as much like blinders as lenses because they restrict our vision to ¶ a narrow range of options. Nietzsche said that if the only tool you have ¶ is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail. Under such conditions it is pretty hard to resist hammering. Analogously, if the only ¶ vision we have is warist and the only tools we build are weapons, then ¶ every conflict invites military intervention and it is hard to resist war-¶ ring. Unless we envision a wider value perspective than the warist, we ¶ will not see the nonviolent options before us. But to see more widely ¶ we need to acknowledge and remove the blinders.¶ Peace education is a small, struggling, but growing segment of ¶ contemporary education. The dominant presumption of warism has ¶ made it difficult for those committed to peace education to develop ¶ and establish it as a legitimate discipline devoid of the image of mere ¶ anti- militarist propaganda. Some scholars call themselves peace educators while many within the traditional disciplines are reluctant to be ¶ so labeled; they may be sympathetic with genuine peace research and ¶ teaching but afraid of the stigma that goes with the label. Those scholars interested in applying their professional training and skills to peace ¶ issues face a monumental task. Education at all levels must address ¶ warism, just as they have had to address racism, sexism, ageism, classism, homophobia, and other forms of domination.4 There is increasing ¶ academic interest in what scholars call “institutional violence”— social ¶ structures like racism, sexism, and poverty that involve constraints ¶ that injure and violate; systems that have entrapping, coercive effects. Institutional forms of violence tend to be more covert than overt; ¶ nonetheless pacifists— peacemakers—of various sorts tend to work ¶ toward the recognition and abolition of these forms of oppression as ¶ the natural manifestation of their commitment to positive peace. Such ¶ work involves recovery of lost or neglected history, consideration of a ¶ full range of options beyond traditional social constraints holding the ¶ forms of domination in place, and serious, systematic, and legitimized ¶ study of conditions constituting positive peace. Preparing for war in ¶ an effort to prevent war and preserve the status quo must be distinguished from preparing for genuine positive peace in an effort to en-¶ courage cooperation and preclude a resort to war. Unless such issues ¶ are entertained routinely across all educational levels— including the ¶ recognition of how the various forms of domination are entangled in ¶ and reinforced by warism— the presumption of warism will continue ¶ to drive us toward war realism and prevent progress toward an evolving positive peace.5 Easing the grip of warism may be unlikely, but ¶ then racial integration in public schools, abolition of slavery, women ¶ voting and holding public office, the end of apartheid in South Africa ¶ and the Iron Curtain in Europe, the election of an African American ¶ as U.S. president, all were exceedingly unlikely not long before they ¶ became realities. People imagine, work for, and sacrifice for important ¶ goals even if they never are achieved. To the wonder of us all, unlikely ¶ goals are sometimes reached. Martin Luther King, Jr., believed that “the arc of history bends ¶ toward justice.” He knew that racial segregation would end . . . some-¶ day . . . so he called on Americans to “plan for the inevitable.”6 Similarly, pacifists envision a broad cultural evolution from warism toward ¶ (and eventually, to) pacifism, so pacifists ask us to prepare for the inevitable by recognizing and backing away from warism and by working to ¶ create and sustain the conditions of genuine positive peace. While education is crucial, peace educators cannot bear the burden of the ¶ wider cultural failure to see beyond warism. Scholars and teachers in ¶ traditional disciplines must address the relevant warist/pacifist issues ¶ of their fields just as feminist scholarship has been undertaken by academics in all fields, and just as racist claims have been tested and dispelled by research in all disciplines. Anti-warism work and positive ¶ peace making cannot be ghettoized in token departments and journals ¶ and dismissed for pushing an agenda; they must be undertaken across every curriculum, not marginalized but central, if we are to assist in ¶ preparing for the inevitable. It is remarkable how low peace research is ¶ among government and foundation priorities. The moral continuum ¶ here may prove useful in eroding warist obstacles to taking peace positively if only because it recognizes gradual variations among views ¶ within a single moral tradition rather than encouraging polarized ¶ views. Peace research and study need not lead to any conversion experiences; it would be surprising were they to do so, despite popular ¶ fears.

## Cap

### A2 Perm Do Both

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#### E – impossible – can only “start” once – the aff was fatally flawed

Jenkins 73 – Professor of Philosophy @ University of Alabama [Iredell Jenkins, “The Conditions of Peace”, The Monist, Vol. 57, No. 4, Philosophy of War (OCTOBER, 1973), pp. 507-526, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902329] Gender Edited

I shall argue in this paper that our thinking about the question of war and peace is vitiated at its source by a series of mistaken assumptions and intentions. These misconceptions pass as sound coin because they have the air of truisms: they appear to direct our inquiries along lines that are sure to be successful and are anyway the only ones available. At the same time, these errors are so basic that they distort both theory and practice from the start: they are red herrings, putting us on a false scent from which we never free ourselves because we cannot get close enough to the quarry to recognize our mistake. It is my purpose to expose these errors and point the way to their correction. Three basic mistakes have misled our thinking about war and peace. We have employed the wrong categories. We have studied the wrong data. And we have pursued the wrong goal. These errors are intimately related, with each in turn entailing the next. The categories we think in focus our attention too narrowly. The data we pore over yield distorted conclusions. The goals we are thus led to pursue are mirages that grow fainter the closer we approach them. It will be necessary to discuss these errors serially, but it must be remembered that they are in reality tightly forged links in a closed chain. 1. The controlling factor in all human undertakings is the conceptual apparatus that men [people] employ-the terms in which they think. These modes of thought largely determine the data we examine, the phenomena we are interested in, the questions we ask, and the purposes we pursue. In more homely language, this apparatus defines where we look, what we look for, and what we hope to do. And it is here, at their very first step, that our dealings with the problem of war and peace go astray. Our mistake is simple but critical: we think in terms that focus our attention on only one side of the issue, and that the more superficial and derivative side. What we do, in brief, is to treat war as an independent variable, which is to be understood in isolation from any larger context and dealt with strictly on its own terms. We appear to act on the assumption that wars are ultimate and ineradicable features of reality, so there are only two things we can do about them: delay their occurrence and make sure we win them when they occur. Seen in the light of reason, this procedure is paradoxical. The real and final object of our concern is peace. We want to establish amicable relations among people, and create a community of feeling and interests. Yet the overwhelming proportion of our thinking, talking, and acting is concerned with war. It is war, in fact and in threat, that constantly preoccupies us. So the universe of discourse in which we treat the problem of war and peace has a vocabulary that is derived entirely from only one of these elements: war. The concepts that dominate our thinking are 'nation states', 'sovereignty', 'foreign powers', 'treaties', 'alliances', 'the balance of power', 'nuclear deterrents', and other such. War so fascinates us that we are incapable of viewing it in perspective and putting it in context. So we fail to see that war is only one element in a complex set of human relationships, which can be neutralized by other and very different elements. Instead, we persist in thinking that the threat of war can be averted, and war itself 'won', only in the terms that it itself poses: namely, the appeal to force. Peace may be the object of our prayers, but war is the object of our efforts. I remarked above that there is something extremely paradoxical about this situation. But there is nothing unusual about it: this is not an isolated case, but an instance of a general type of behavior. In one context after another, we find men neglecting to pursue the good they seek and thinking only of averting the evil they fear. Many dichotomies of this sort come easily to mind: peace-war, health-illness, justice-injustice, equality-discrimination, rehabilitation-punishment. In every instance, it is the second item on which we lavish our efforts. It simply seems to be the case that in all of the contexts of life men [people] tend to take sound and satisfactory situations for granted, and to be concerned only with those that are unpleasant, threatening, or harmful. So instead of trying to preserve peace, we think only of preventing wars-or winning them. In short, we are in the odd position of not seeking the ends that we desire, but merely trying to avert or cure the outcomes we fear. Indeed, we do not even think much about these goods, and we usually define them as the absence of their opposites. So though our approach to the problem of war and peace is paradoxical, it is not anomolous. 2. Our initial mistake in dealing with the issues of war and peace is to employ the wrong categories: our thinking is done exclusively in terms of 'war' and concepts associated with it. The immediate result of this mistake is to focus our attention on a narrow and inadequate range of data. The common meaning of 'war' is a conflict between nation states, waged by armies using every weapon of force available, in which each party seeks to defeat the other (the "enemy") and reduce it to a condition of total subservience. As Clausewitz put it in his classic treatise, "War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will".1 Since we think in terms of war, and this is what war means, these are the data we turn to when we seek enlightenment on the issues of war and peace: we look only at the relations between sovereign states, and then only when these states are in a condition of actual or threatened violent conflict. We thus find ourselves in the absurd position of trying to understand peace by studying war. This is like trying to understand motion by studying rest, as the ancients did, or trying to derive the character of man from the nature of God, as the mediaevalists did. We deride these latter efforts as exercises in futility. But we employ an exactly analogous procedure in our approach to peace, and we are perpetually surprised and frustrated when it does not succeed. What we are doing, in sum, is using the pathological case as a paradigm for studying the sound case. So we become expert only in the pathology of international relations. Our fascination with the phenomena of war leads us to certain conclusions that become as unshakeable as they are deceptive. We regard the sovereign state as at once a brute fact and an impenetrable mystery. We assume that there must be irreconcilable conflicts of interest among such states. Since these conflicts can be neither resolved nor arbitrated, they must eventually lead to trial by force. Given the facts that we study, these conclusions follow naturally.

#### Militarist component overwhelms every other frame – war machine leaves no room for compromise – attempt to combine collapses into incoherence ripe for neoconservative cooption. Aff cannot control the nature of their performance through intent – spin and strategic manipulation of war-frame can be used against the aff in the long-run because militarist imperatives rise to the top\*\*\*

Megroan 8 (Nick, Department of Geography, University of Newcastle, UK, “Militarism, Realism, Just War, or Nonviolence?”, Jan 1, Geopolitics, EBSCO, CMR)

**Every student** of the relations between states, **who** also **holds that** scholarly engagement **must** not merely **be theoretical and empirical but also** political **and** moral**, cannot avoid facing the question: in what circumstances,** if at all, **should a state be considered right in making or joining war?** The argument of this paper is simply that critical geopolitics has not properly grappled with this question in a systematic and consistent way. By virtue of opposition to certain wars but advocacy of others, by implicit use of just war categories and language in moral reasoning, it is de facto operating within the parameters **of** a version of **just war theory.** However, because this appro- priation is not made explicit – indeed, because just war theory is at times summarily dismissed – its appropriation is partial. This selective appropriat ion is problematic. Whilst critical geopolitical analyses of individual wars might be insightful and compelling, **the bigger picture may be one of** incoherence and subjectivity. The purpose of theory selectively deployed becomes confusing, critique may be turned in on itself, there is a lack of clarity and rigour in moral reasoning despite superficial rhetorical appeals to morality, and the political intent of the project becomes unclear and even co-optable **to the service of** neoconservatism. This partial and contradictory appropriation of just war theory is also intellectually unsatisfying, **and** limits the potential of critical geopolitics **to be taken seriously outside** a **small, self-selecting readership**. My objection thus far is not to just war theory per se. It provides a framework for reasoning about warfare that regards it as an evil to be deployed in only exceptional circumstances, and (despite its name), its pre- sumption is against violence. We liv e in a messy and complicated and vio- lent world. Just war theory’s insistence, against realism and militarism, that military violence is not beyond the le gitimate sphere of moral reasoning is important, and the arguments for the occasional and limited use of force to restore peace and rectify injustice are strong ones. If critical geopolitics wishes to locate itself explicitly in this school of thought, it will find compel- ling reasons for doing so and many allies already there. By this process, it will certainly refine and advance the project (of critical geopolitics) with an injection of intellectual rigour. As I have suggested with reference to Toal’s critique of the 1991 US war on Iraq as being about American identity, it could in turn also make an original contribution to thought about the category of just intention . However, whilst recognising its pa cific intent, **I remain** personally **unconvinced by just war theory** as used either consistently by theorists and jurists, or partially as in critical geopolit ics. Critical geopolitics, as I read it, is not simply about exposing the power-knowledge relationships at the heart of geopolitical reasoning, 91 and denaturalising the global order by portray- ing it as socially and historically constructed 92 through an “examination of the geographical assumpti ons, designations, and understandings that enter into the making of world politics” 93 and how places and people are stitched together to narrate and explain events. 94 It is all of these, but it is more: **a political project committed**, as Dalby puts it, **to challenging the specifications of politics and dangers used** to justify violence. 95 **Nonviolence, as a** positive political **method and** also a **vision** of peac e and justice that explicitly **eschews the resort to force,** is a project that has only recently begun to be studied and theorised in a system atic manner, and ha s already yielded many promising results. 96 Personally, like a growing number of people, I am persuaded by the case for a Christian praxis of nonviolence. 97 Geopolitics has a long and bloody history of providing arguments for war 98 – critical geopolitics should reject the temptation to provide more, and place its capa- bilities and insights in the service of this exciting relatively new and under- resourced proj ect, not just war theory, realism, or militarism. In his history of twentieth-century geopolitical thought, Polelle observed that it “led its believers to be resigned to the necessity of violent international conflict”. 99 It would be deeply ironic if critical geopolitics we re to make the same mis- take in the twenty-first.

#### We address the root cause of attendance – economics cut against trending enrollment of black students – the aff does not address the key factor in participation

Robert Longley 9/6/2013 “College Enrollment Declines After Steady Growth”, <http://usgovinfo.about.com/b/2013/09/06/college-enrollment-declines-after-steady-growth.htm>

After six years of substantial and steady growth, U.S. college enrollment has fallen by nearly half a million students in less than a year, according to new report from the U.S. Census Bureau.¶ Statistics from the Census Bureau's School Enrollment: 2012, showed that college enrollment in fall 2012 plunged by 467,000 students compared to fall 2011. The decline, which includes both graduate and undergraduate students, reversed a trend that saw college enrollment soar by 3.2 million students between 2006 and 2011.¶ The report provides an annual look at the characteristics of students enrolled in all levels of schools from nursery to graduate school. Data includes enrollment by age, sex, race, Hispanic origin and country in which the students were born.¶ Also See: Federal Student Aid Primer¶ The greatest decline came among older students, age 25 and older. Their enrollment fell by 419,000, while the enrollment of younger students declined by 48,000.¶ Hispanic Enrollment Increased¶ While college enrollment among white students fell by 1.1 million and black students by 108,000, enrollment of Hispanic college students rose to 3.4 million, up 447,000 between 2011 and 2012. Overall, Hispanics made up almost 22% of all students enrolled in all levels of education from preschool to graduate school in 2012, an increase of nearly 16% since 2002.¶ "This increase in the number of Hispanics enrolled in college can be attributed to the combination of an increase in the adult Hispanic population and their climbing likelihood of being enrolled," said Census Bureau statistician Julie Siebens in a press release.¶ More Diversity on Campus¶ The Census report also reveals the growing diversity among U.S. college students. While the percentage of non-Hispanic white college students fell from 67% to 58% between 2006 and 2012, the percentage of Hispanic students rose from 11% to 17% over the same period and the percentage of black students rose from 14% to 15%.¶ In addition, the percentage of foreign-born students enrolled in preschool through college increased to almost 30% in 2012, up from 28.4% in 2002.¶ The statistics also showed a reduction in the popularity of private schools. The number of students enrolled in private elementary, middle and high schools fell from 4.8 million in 2005, to 4.2 million in 2012.¶ Is it the Rising Cost of College?¶ While the Census Bureau offered no reasons for the declining enrollment in U.S. colleges, it seems only logical that the ever-increasing cost of going to college has played a role.

#### The narrative of the 1ac is thus only a function to describe the antagonisms below it, they do not paint a picture of resolution that enabls an overcoming of the violence toward the voices of the 1ca

Zizek 1997 [Slavoj, *The Plague of Fantasies,* NYC: Verso, 1999, 10-1//]

The third point: fantasy is the primordial form of narrative, which serves to occult some original deadlock. The sociopolitical fantasy par excellence, of course, is the myth of 'primordial accumulation': the narrative of the two workers, one lazy and free-spending, the other diligent and enterprising, accumulating and investing, which provides the myth of the 'origins of capitalism', obfuscating the violence of its actual genealogy. Notwithstanding his emphasis on symbolization and/or historicization in the 1950s, Lacan is thus radically anti-narratavist: the ultimate aim of psychoanalytic treatment is not for the analysand to organize his confused life experience into (another) coherent narrative, with all the traumas properly integrated, and so on. It is not only that some narratives are 'false', based upon the exclusion of traumatic events and patching up the gaps left by these exclusions – Lacan's thesis is much stronger: the answer to the question 'Why do we tell stories?' is that narrative as such emerges in order to resolve some fundamental antagonism by rearranging its terms into a temporal succession. It is thus the form of narrative which bears witness to some repressed antagonism. The price one pays for the narrative resoution is the petitioprincipis of the temporal loop – the narrative silenty presupposes as already given what it purports to reproduce the narrative of 'primordial accumulation' effectively explains nothing, since it already presupposes a worker behavinglike a full-blown capitalist.

#### The use of stories and narratives is descriptive of the link par excellence. Accepting the validity of all narratives equally creates a dull and homogenous multiculturalism and stifles anti-fascist political struggles – this means there never will be mobilization from the 1ac.

Zizek 2002 [Slavoj, “I am a Fighting Athest: Interview with SlavojZizek,” Bad Subjects, Issue 59 Feb 2002, eserver.org/bs/59/zizek.html]

Zizek**:** I think that we should accept that universalism is a Eurocentrist notion. This may sound racist, but I don't think it is. Even when Third World countries appeal to freedom and democracy, when they formulate their struggle against European imperialism, they are at a more radical level endorsing the European premise of universalism. You may remember that in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the ANC always appealed to universal Enlightenment values, and it was Buthelezi, the regime's black supporter in the pay of the CIA, who appealed to special African values. My opponent here is the widely accepted position that we should leave behind the quest for universal truth — that what we have instead are just different narratives about who we are, the stories we tell about ourselves. So, in that view, the highest ethical injunction is to respect the other story. All the stories should be told, each ethnic, political, or sexual group should be given the right to tell its story, as if this kind of tolerance towards the plurality of stories with no universal truth value is the ultimate ethical horizon. I oppose this radically. This ethics of storytelling is usually accompanied by a right to narrate, as if the highest act you can do today is to narrate your own story, as if only a black lesbian mother can know what it's like to be a black lesbian mother, and so on. Now this may sound very emancipatory. But the moment we accept this logic, we enter a kind of apartheid.In a situation of social domination, all narratives are not the same. For example, in Germany in the 1930s, the narrative of the Jews wasn't just one among many. This was the narrative that explained the truth about the entire situation. Or today, take the gay struggle. It's not enough for gays to say, "we want our story to be heard." No, the gay narrative must contain a universal dimension, in the sense that their implicit claim must be that what happens to us is not something that concerns only us. What is happening to us is a symptom or signal that tells us something about what's wrong with the entirety of society today. We have to insist on this universal dimension.

# 1NR

### Links

#### Their understanding of Power – is a link – the Cross-x of the 1AC articulates power as fluid concept, that is problematic because it allows capitalism to deterritorialize and reinforce itself

Kevin Cryderman, “Jane and Louisa: The Tapestry Of Critical Paradigms: Hutcheon, Lyotard, Said, Dirlik, And Brodber,” 2000, http://65.107.211.206/post/caribbean/brodber/kcry1.html,

In "Borderlands Radicalism," Dirlik is critical of the trends of postmodernism and postcolonialism in regard to borders, subjectivity, and history. Dirlik claims that postmodernism and postcolonialism tend to simply reinforce the reign of late capitalism: Post-modernism, articulating the condition of the globe in the age of flexible production, has done great theoretical service by challenging the tyrannical unilinearity of inherited conceptions of history and society. The political price paid for this achievement, however, has been to abolish the subject in history, which destroys the possibility of political action, or to attach action to one of another diffuse subject positions, which ends up in narcissistic preoccupations with self of one kind of another. (89) Dirlik claims that the 'happy pluralism' of postcolonialism -- such as its emphasis on flux, borderlands and liminal space -- does not so much oppose elite unified narratives of nations and cultures as it does reinforce them. Dirlik also links this trend of "fluid subject positions" (98) in postmodernism to postcolonialism and Global Capitalism: "in the age of flexible production, we all live in the borderlands. Capital, deterritorialized and decentered, establishes borderlands where it can move freely, away from the control of states and societies but in collusion with states against societies" (Dirlik 87). Moreover, the problem "presented by postcolonial discourse" is "a problem of liberating discourse that divorces itself from the material conditions of life, in this case Global Capitalism as the foundational principle of contemporary society globally" (99). Dirlik also links the intellectual class as a product of global capitalism which, according to Dirlik, "has jumbled up notions of space and time" (100). Indeed, both postmodernist and post-colonialist literature involve the fragmentation and rebellion against modernist ideologies that impose essentializing identity, linear time schemes, and totalizing narratives.

#### Torres evidence is about Coloniality and slavery – ununderlined parts also refer to pre-African slavery. It’s existed as long as conquest – proven by history of Roman empire – capitalism is the root cause of expansion. Slavery is also a question of production – racism was just a byproduct of needing to justify infinite expansion at all costs.

Kovel, 2002 [Joel Kovel**,** Alger Hiss Prof. At Bard, 2002 The Enemy of Nature, Zed Books, p. 123-125]

If, however we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially [hu]man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable — indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.’0 Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman’s labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional.

### Power Exists Differently

#### The affirmative makes notion of class just another marker like racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. This makes it impossible to access anti-capitalism

Slavoj Zizek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies in Ljubljana, 2000, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, p. 95-97

Let me, then, take a closer look at Laclau’s narrative which runs from Marxist essentialism the proletariat as the universal (lass whose revolu­tionary mission is inscribed into its very social being and thus discernible via ‘objective’ scientific analysis) to the ‘postmodern’ recognition of the contingent, tropological, metaphorico-metonymic, link between a social agent and its ‘task’. Once this contingency is acknowledged, one has to accept that there is no direct, ‘natural’ correlation between an agent’s social position and its tasks in the political struggle, no norm of devel­opment by which to measure exceptions say because of the weak political subjectivity of the bourgeoisie in Russia around 1900, the work­ing class had to accomplish the bourgeois-democratic revolution itself. My first observation here is that while this standard post— modern Leftist narrative of the passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism with the proletariat as the unique Historical Subject, the privileging of economic class struggle, and so on, to the postmodern irreducible plu­rality of struggles undoubtedly describes an actual historical process, its proponents, as a rule, lease out the resignation at its heart the accept­ance of capitalism as ‘the only game in town’, the renunciation of any real attempt to overcome the existing capitalist liberal regime. This point was already made very precisely in Wendy Brown’s perspicuous observation that ‘the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain renaturalization of capitalism’. The crucial question to be asked is thus: to what extent a critique of capitalism is foreclosed by the current con­figuration of oppositional politics, and not simply by the ‘loss of the socialist alternative’ or the ostensible ~triumph of liberalism’ in the global order. In contrast with the Marxist critique of a social whole and Marxist vision of total transformation, to what extent do identity politics require a standard internal to existing society against which to pitch their claims, a standard that not only preserves capitalism from critique, but sustains the invisibility and inarticulateness of class — not incidentally, but endem­ically? Could we have stumbled upon one reason why class is invariably named but rarely theorized or developed in the multiculturalist mantra, ‘race, class, gender, sexuality’?1 One can describe in very precise terms this reduction of class to an entity ‘named but rarely theorized’: one of the great and permanent results of the so-called ‘Western Marxism’ first formulated by the young Lukics is that the class-and-commodity structure of capitalism is not just a phenomenon limited to the particular ‘domain’ of economy, but the structuring principle that overdetermines the social totality, from politics to art and religion. This global dimension of capitalism is sus­pended in today’s multiculturalist progressive politics: its ‘anti-capitalism’ is reduced to the level of how today’s capitalism breeds sexist/racist oppression, and so on. Marx claimed that in the series production—distribution —exchange—consumption, the term ‘production’ is doubly inscribed: it is simultaneously one of the terms in the series and the structuring principle of the entire series. In production as one of the terms of the series, production (as the structuring principle) ‘encounters itself in its oppositional determination’,’2 as Marx put it, using the pre­cise Hegelian term. And the same goes for the postmodern political series class—gender—race…: in class as one of the terms in the series of particular struggles, class qua structuring principle of the social totality encounters itself in its oppositional determination’.3 In so far as post­modern politics promotes, in effect, a kind of ‘politicization of the economy’, is not this politicization similar to the way our supermarkets which fundamentally exclude from their field of visibility the actual production process (the way vegetables and fruit are harvested and packed by immigrant workers, the genetic and other manipulations in their production and display, etc.) — stage within the field of the dis­played goods, as a kind of ersatz, the spectacle of a pseudo-production (meals prepared in full view in ‘food courts’, fruit juices freshly squeezed before the customers’ eyes, etc.)?’5 An authentic Leftist should therefore ask the postmodern politicians the new version of the old Freudian question put to the perplexed Jew: ‘Why are von saving that one should politicize the economy, when one should in fact politicize the economy?’ So: in so far as postmodern politics involves a ‘[t]heoretical retreat from the problem of domination within capitalism’, it is here. in this silent suspension of class analysis, that we are dealing with an exemplary case of the mechanism of ideological displacement: when class antagonism is disavowed, when its key structuring role is suspended. ‘other markers of social difference may come to hear an inordinate weight; indeed, they may hear all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that attributable to the explicitly politicized marking”7. In other words, this displacement accounts for the somewhat ’excessive’ way the discourse of postmodern identity politics insists on the horrors of sexism, racism, and so on -- this ‘excess’ comes from the fact that these other ‘-isms’ have to hear the surplus-investment from the class struggle whose extent is not acknowledged.’8

### A2 Privilige

#### The Alternative is not a movement with a leader but a method that embraces utopia – their articulation of privilege is another link – it prevents a focus on the larger structures of capital

Adam Katz, English Instructor at Onodaga Community College. 2000. *Postmodernism and the Politics of “Culture.”* Pg.176

Specific modes of knowledge and technique begin to appear fundamen­tally violent and illegitimate in relation to a different mode of sovereignty. Consequently, the primary responsibility of the specific intellectual, the self-reflexive inquiry into the modes of power/knowledge that have formed one, i.e., “unlearning privilege,” is nothing but a transfer of alle­giance to new modes of marketized sovereignty emerging around knowl­edge production. The counterpublics, meanwhile, and their border-cross­ing diplomats are simply negotiating points, playing one form of marketized sovereignty off against another. Such conditions complicate politics, of course—no one gets to choose which mode of marketized sov­ereignty they come into direct confrontation with—but this doesn’t liqui­date the universalizing political principles. The very fragmentation of the “common” is at stake in the multiplication of sovereign forms, since the legitimacy of any sovereignty is in the space it provides for theory, ac­countability, and power to be articulated before an outside. To put it dif­ferently, how wide a scope does a given mode of sovereignty provide for each to be “outside of the outside of the other,” on a global scale? In this way, we can also account for the hierarchy arranging different modes of sovereignty, in terms of where the antagonism between privatized modes of sovereignty and transnational modes of accountability are most con­centrated.